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Abstract
Three essays on capital flight
by
Jaehyun Suh
Consequent to developed and liberalized financial markets in emerging market economies,
the magnitude of gross capital outflows is getting larger. My dissertation focuses on
massive foreign asset purchases by domestic agents which is called capital flight and the
study aims to see new empirical evidence on its impact and determinants and the as-
sociations between it and other macro variables using diverse methods in econometrics.
In particular, I am interested in its role in emerging market economies since they are
especially vulnerable to such large and unexpected capital flows.
First chapter investigates the impact of capital flight on domestic countries’
real GDP growth and investment. Specifically, it employs diverse GMM estimators
(difference, system, and orthogonal deviation GMM) to estimate their causal effects and
uses interaction models to test the hypothesis that the effect of flights is conditional on
the amount of external loans (gross capital inflows) in the country. The results show that
flights are harmful only if there are not enough external loans and, otherwise, they fail
to depress domestic economies. They are contrasted with those of capital inflow stops,
which consistently decrease growth and, therefore, indicate inflow stops and outflow
flights are different phenomena.
viii
Second chapter estimates the impacts of domestic private saving and gross
capital inflows on gross capital outflows in 56 emerging market economies over 1990
- 2014 using Powell’s (2015) quantile regression methodology. The purpose is to test
two hypotheses: first, capital outflows are mostly fueled by capital inflows rather than
by domestic saving and, second, the causal impact of capital inflows is stronger in the
upper quantiles of capital outflows. According to the result, the response of capital
outflows to capital inflows and domestic saving is similar if capital outflows are below
the median. However, if they are above the median, the impact of external loans is
stronger than that of saving. Furthermore, a country tends to borrow from foreign
countries to purchase debts rather than equities in the short run. It is consistent with
several stylized facts such as pro-cyclical capital inflows and outflows and high leverage
ratio and high probability of serial default and sudden stops during short-term booms.
Third chapter studies the association between extreme gross capital outflow
movements (flight and retrenchment) and diverse financial crises (banking, currency,
debt, and inflation crises) in 60 emerging markets between 1980 and 2009. Consider-
ing that the movements reflect domestic agents’ strong preferences for (against) foreign
assets, domestic turmoil might have affected or conversely been triggered by their be-
havior. In either case, large capital outflows are associated with crises and provide
valuable information to both foreign interests and domestic policymakers. Results from
the complementary log-log model show, first, that banking, currency, and inflation crises
are associated with capital flight; second, debt crises are also associated with capital
flight, but the result is not robust to different specifications; third, the positive associa-
ix
tion between capital flight and crises is mainly driven by banking flows rather than FDI
and portfolio flows; and finally, capital retrenchment is not associated with any kind
of crisis. The results support several arguments addressed in the existing literature,
including the “flight-to-safety” hypothesis and the self-fulfilling prophecy.
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Chapter 1
Does capital flight depress growth and
investment in emerging markets?
1.1 Introduction
Thanks to developed and liberalized financial markets, domestic investors in
emerging markets are enjoying broader opportunities than ever to diversify their port-
folios. As a result, not only capital inflows by foreign investors but also capital outflows
by domestic investors play a significant role in their financial accounts. Figure 1.1
describes domestic investors’ contribution to financial accounts in selected emerging
markets. Before 2000, the magnitude of capital outflows (% of GDP) was very small
and hardly fluctuated. Such behavior of capital outflows contrasts with that of capital
inflows which was much larger and more volatile. For that reason, net capital flows were
almost the perfect proxy for gross capital inflows. Since 2000, however, the magnitude
1
and volatility of gross capital outflows have been getting closer to those of gross capital
inflows.1 This raises the possibility that large and volatile capital outflows may have a
substantial impact on domestic economies.
Figure 1.1: Capital flows in emerging markets between 1980 and 2015 (IMF BOPS and
WEO)
Motivated by such stylized fact, this essay aims to answer the following three
questions:
• What is the impact of massive capital outflows on emerging markets’ economic
growth?
• Is capital flight a different phenomenon from a sudden stop in capital inflows?
1For the stylized facts on gross capital inflows and outflows, see Broner et al. (2013).
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• Is the impact of capital flight conditional on external loans available in domestic
countries?
Foreign assets are substitutes, to some extent, for domestic assets. Capital
flight might, therefore, imply domestic companies’ loss of working capital loans by al-
lowing domestic agents to invest abroad. Although this traditional view has represented
one of the main concerns on flight events,2 the impact of capital flight could be condi-
tional upon the availability of external loans. For example, if there are enough external
loans in the country and investors have access to financial markets, they may not need
to sell their domestic assets to finance foreign investments. In this case, capital flights
would not necessarily depress domestic investment. It may, rather, promote economic
growth by allowing investors to take fruitful investment opportunities.
Addressing the underlying causality of capital flights and stops is very impor-
tant for addressing these issues. For example, if flights are fleeing behavior to avoid
domestic turmoil, the estimation of flights on domestic economy will overstate the dam-
age from them because simple association cannot tell which came first. Therefore, we
need to address endogeneity bias and, for that purpose, I employ three kinds of GMM
estimators: difference, system, and orthogonal deviation GMM.3
The contribution of this essay to the existing literature is three-fold. First,
unlike previous research, which focused on the association between macro variables and
capital outflows, I measure unbiased estimates for the causality of capital flights on
2For example, see Cuddington (1986).
3For the descriptions on GMM estimators, see Appendix A.3.
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domestic economies. Second, I use interaction models to test the hypothesis that the
impact of capital flight is conditional on the amount of foreign loans. Third, I investigate
whether flights reduce domestic investment to shed light on the reason why the impact
of flights and that of stops are different.
Previewing the results, I find that capital flight itself does not depress GDP
growth on average and the estimates are remarkably different from those of sudden
capital stops. However, flights depress growth when there are not enough external loans
(coincidence with stops). This is new empirical evidence not discussed in the existing
literature, which has emphasized their negative effects and similarity with stops only. To
explain the reason, it is necessary to review the previous research examining the channels
through which stops affect the real economy. Although there are diverse channels, most
of studies agree stops in capital inflows severely reduce domestic investment. On the
contrary, this essay shows that the impact of capital outflows on domestic investment
is insignificant.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews existing literature on
capital flight. Section 1.3 explains data, the definitions of episodes on capital flows, and
presents stylized facts on them. Section 1.4 introduces regression models and reports
the results and Section 1.5 summarizes the essay and concludes it.
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1.2 Related literature
Negative description on capital flight stems from the experience of Latin Amer-
ica in the 1970s and 1980s. When several countries in Latin America were in domestic
turmoil, domestic investors moved their funds to safer global markets and such behavior
certainly worsened the countries’ economic situation. After that, many researchers have
studied to explain why capital flight is costly. For example, Cuddington (1986) suggests
seven reasons why capital flight is harmful, Alesina and Tabellini (1989) argue private
capital outflows are associated with low domestic investment because of political uncer-
tainty and Bennett (1988) asserts capital flight brings high external debts by studying
four Caribbean countries’ cases.
Following them, there have been several attempts to estimate sudden increases
in gross capital outflows in recent years. For example, Cowan et al. (2008) call large
drops in net capital inflows by gross capital outflows as an outflow-driven sudden stop
(sudden start) and argue it is destructive for emerging markets although the adverse
effect is smaller than that of a sudden stop. Similarly, Rothenberg and Warnock (2011)
call the former as sudden flight and argue the difference in pain experienced during
sudden flights and stops is not severe. Cavallo et al. (2015) investigate how the effect
of reversal in gross capital outflows changes by corresponding reversals in gross capital
inflows and net flows. It is noteworthy that most of them estimate the cyclical behavior
of macro variables around capital flight events using time trend models; that is, they
focus on the association between macro variables and gross capital outflows. On the
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contrary, this essay attempts to estimate the causal effects of gross capital outflows
using GMM estimators and shows flights are harmless to domestic economies in the
sense that they do not depress GDP growth directly.
My study especially focuses on the impacts of flights on domestic investment
in order to prove that flights and stops are different phenomena. Stops depress growth
by hurting domestic investment. For instance, Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reign-
hart (2000) emphasize the incidence of nonperforming loans and following bankruptcies,
which are caused by capital inflow slowdown. Mendoza (2010) also emphasizes the role
of collateral constraint binding, which might be caused by a cessation of capital inflows.
In this case, companies need to pay extra financing premia or liquidate their assets. As
a result, they are forced to reduce working capital and production and factor demands
drop. However, if a capital flight fails to depress domestic investment, it indicates the
channels through which a capital stop depresses domestic economies do not work for
a capital flight. For this reason, the essay will show that capital flights do not reduce
domestic investment and prove capital stops and flights are different.
1.3 Data, definitions, and stylized facts
1.3.1 Data
The data consists of 56 emerging market economies from 1990 to 2014 ex-
cluding (1) major oil-exporting countries, (2) bank havens, and (3) those which are
categorized as low-income groups according to 2008 GNI per capita by the World Bank
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considering they might work as strong outliers in the group (see Appendix A.1 for
the list of countries). All countries have at least 15 years and 10 consecutive years of
gross capital outflow data (source: IMF BOPS). As specified in other papers, IMF data
does not clarify whether some missing values in outflows are zero or not available (e.g.,
see Forbes and Warnock (2012a)). Following others, I replaced them with zero if the
surrounding values are zeros or left them empty, otherwise.
Gross capital outflows (inflows) are net foreign-asset purchases by domestic
agents (net domestic-asset purchases by foreign agents) that include (1) FDI, (2) port-
folio investments (equities and debts), and (3) other investments (e.g., trade credits,
loans, and deposits). Total investment (domestic investment) is gross capital forma-
tion. Data sources and the definition of variables can be found in Appendix A.2 in
detail.
1.3.2 The definitions of capital flow episodes: flight and stop
The formal definitions of flight and stop are as follows:
• Flight: a large purchasing of foreign assets by domestic agents
• Stop: a large selling (or large reduction in purchase) of domestic assets by foreign
agents
Furthermore, such flows should be evaluated as large deviations from country-specific
experiences and by global experiences. Accordingly, each episode is defined by dummies
as follows:
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• Flight: 
1 if KOjt ∈ {top 30% of (KOjs)Ts=1} ∩ {top 30% of (KOjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
• Stop: 
1 if KIjt ∈ {bottom 30% of (KIjs)Ts=1} ∩ {bottom 30% of (KIjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
where KOjt is gross capital outflows (% of GDP) in country j at time t. Likewise,
KIjt is gross capital inflows (% of GDP) in country j at time t. Therefore, ‘top 30%
of (KOjs)
T
s=1’ implies gross capital outflows are remarkably large by country j’s own
experience and ‘top 30% (KOjs)
N,T
i=1,s=1’ implies outflows are also remarkably large by
cross-country experiences. Using these dummy variables, I estimate the impact of capital
flights and stops in emerging markets.
1.3.3 Stylized facts
This section provides some stylized facts on capital flight. Figure 1.2 shows the
number of flights and annual average of gross capital outflows. Two interesting points
emerge from it. First, the number of flights has been constantly increasing except
2008 when the global financial crisis occurred. Considering gross capital outflows were
normalized by current GDP, it indicates the growth rate of capital outflows surpasses
that of GDP in emerging market economies. Second, there is a remarkable change in
gross capital outflows when a country experiences capital flights. We can see gross
capital outflows are at least three times larger during flights compared to those during
8
tranquil times. It confirms capital flights are distinctive events when domestic agents
strongly preferred foreign assets.
Figure 1.2: Annual capital flights and average gross capital outflows (1990-2014)
Notes: the y-axis represents average overall outflows (red bar) and average outflows in flights (blue bar)
in % of GDP and the number of flights (black line).
Figure 1.3 and Table 1.1 report the relationship between capital flights and
stops. Only 10% of flights coincided with stops and they exhibit negative correlations
between two episodes.4 It might indicate countries had enough external loans when they
were experiencing capital flights. In this case, the loss of working capital by domestic
agents could be minimized by borrowing from abroad. For this reason, to precisely
estimate the impact of capital flights, we need to consider not only the amount of
capital outflows but also the amount of capital inflows in a country.
4The correlation between flights and stops in this essay is -0.1193.
9
Figure 1.3: The relation between flights and stops
Table 1.1: The concurrence of flights and stops
Flight No flight Total
Stop 23 (2%) 240 (18%) 263 (20%)
No stop 208 (16%) 827 (64%) 1,035 (80%)
Total 231 (18%) 1,067 (82%) 1,298 (100%)
Notes: the number of episodes as a percentage of total obser-
vations in parenthesis. The data cover the years 1990 - 2014
1.4 Estimation strategy and results
1.4.1 The summary of selected variables
Before getting into the main results, this section reports the description of
variables in the models. They are summarized in two periods separately—when flights
occurred and when they did not—to see how they change between two episodes. Table
1.2 shows the summary. As we can see from Figure 1.2, gross capital outflows were
10
almost seven times larger but gross capital inflows also doubled during flights. On the
contrary, private saving was smaller during flights so it is assumed that people are more
dependent on external loans rather than saving to increase foreign asset purchases. A
more interesting result is that emerging markets were actually enjoying higher growth
during flights while domestic investment was hardly affected. This brief summary again
supports the hypothesis that capital flight is the behavior to take global opportunities
rather than to flee from domestic turmoil.
Table 1.2: The summary of selected variables
Flight
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gross capital outflows (% of GDP) 231 9.468*** 5.638 3.405 50.815
Gross capital inflows (% of GDP) 231 11.015*** 11.778 -24.566 71.014
Real GDP growth (%) 229 4.708*** 5.228 -15.136 22.593
Exchange rate regime 231 6.653** 4.175 1 14
Capital market openness 228 0.486 0.353 0 1
Total investment (% of GDP) 230 24.053 8.385 2.212 58.151
Private saving (% of GDP) 194 11.996* 12.971 -51.706 48.131
No flight
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gross capital outflows (% of GDP) 1,067 1.409 3.128 -15.048 15.029
Gross capital inflows (% of GDP) 1,067 5.406 7.049 -38.985 47.089
Real GDP growth (%) 1,066 3.751 4.142 -23.983 25.788
Exchange rate regime 1,067 7.371 4.045 1 15
Capital market openness 1,047 0.45 0.326 0 1
Total investment (% of GDP) 1,043 23.356 7.148 3.824 59.464
Private saving (% of GDP) 850 13.873 11.081 -69.272 61.769
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significant differences between two periods at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
Welch’s approximation was used.
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1.4.2 Linear-additive model
The study using GMM estimators begins with linear-additive models assuming
the impacts of capital flights and stops on real GDP growth (zgdp) and total investment
(toinv) are simply linear. Regression models are
zgdpit = β1flightit +X
′
itγ + uit
zgdpit = β2stopit +X
′
itγ + uit
zgdpit = β1flightit + β2stopit +X
′
itγ + uit
(1.1)
where stop and flight are dummies and Xit is the matrix for independent variables,
which includes a lagged dependent variable (lzgdp), exchange rate regime (exregime),
and capital market openness (kaopen). Flights and stops are separated from them to
emphasize that they are the main interests. Two episodes were estimated separately first
and then estimated together to perform a Wald test to see whether they are significantly
different (H0 : βˆ1 = βˆ2).
5 uit is the disturbance term that may contain individual-fixed
components and time-fixed components.
Likewise, the impacts of two episodes on total investment (toinv) are estimated
to provide empirical evidence that the channel through which stops hurt domestic econ-
omy does not work for flights. Regression models are
toinvit = β1flightit +X
′
itγ + uit
toinvit = β2stopit +X
′
itγ + uit
toinvit = β1flightit + β2stopit +X
′
itγ + uit
(1.2)
5The interaction of them is estimated in the next subsection.
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where Xit includes real GDP growth (zgdp), private saving (save), and capital market
openness (kaopen), as controlling for these three variables are especially important to
estimate precise impacts of capital flows on domestic investment. A Wald test is again
performed to see whether βˆ1 and βˆ2 are significantly different. In (1.1) and (1.2),
not only capital flow episodes but also all other independent variables are treated as
endogenous except the lagged dependent variable, which is predetermined and time
dummies.
Table 1.3 shows the results on real GDP growth. Stops undoubtedly depress
emerging markets’ growth and it is already a well-known fact discovered by existing
literature. On the other hand, flights fail to depress it and positively but not significantly
contribute to domestic economies on average. More importantly, the result from the
Wald test indicates the impacts of two episodes are significantly different (less than 5%
level). It confirms that capital flight does not depress domestic growth, unlike capital
stop, and flights and stops are different phenomena.
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are moderate, significant,
and range from 0.23 to 0.34, which justify the employment of the dynamic model. For
example, with the coefficient of 0.3 for lagged dependent variable, the damage from
stops increase about 43% in the long run. The estimates of exchange regime are all
negative and significant, which indicates flexible regime hurts the domestic economy.
This is probably because of its negative impact on net exports. The impact of capital
market openness on real GDP growth is inconclusive. All of them are not significant
and the sign of coefficient also changes according to control variables. It is consistent
13
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with Stiglitz’ (2000) argument that capital market liberalization is not always beneficial
for growth because it increases economic instability in many cases.
Table 1.4 shows the impacts of capital flow episodes on domestic investment.
Interestingly, the result shows capital flight does not depress domestic investment ei-
ther. If the opportunity cost of foreign asset purchases is purchases of the same amount
of domestic assets, capital flight has to reduce domestic investment but the result con-
tradicts this intuition. As suggested before, it might indicate domestic agents mostly
use foreign borrowings rather than their savings to increase foreign asset purchases
substantially. If so, savings do not necessarily flow overseas during capital flights and
domestic investment might not be hurt, consequently. Moreover, the results from OLS
and DGMM show that the impacts of two episodes are significantly different. The re-
sults from OGMM and SGMM are against them but it is due to large standard errors in
capital flight.6 For this reason, we can also conclude from Table 1.4 that capital flights
are different from capital stops because they do not reduce domestic investment.
As expected, we can see that real GDP growth and liberalized capital markets
promote domestic investment. On the contrary, it is not clear whether private saving
also promotes domestic investment. Assuming private sectors have two options to put
their savings (domestic markets and global markets), they would not always finance
domestic companies increasing saving in the short term. Their decisions may vary
according to the surrounding environment. Finally, the estimates of control variables
rarely change in both (1.1) and (1.2) regardless of estimators.
6Large standard errors from flights may imply the impact of capital flights vary substantially across
countries.
16
For the robustness check, the dummy variables for capital flow episodes are
replaced with gross capital outflows (outflow) in (1.1) and (1.2). Accordingly, the models
are as follows:
zgdpit = βoutflowit +X
′
itγ + uit (1.3)
toinvit = βoutflowit +X
′
itγ + uit
Table 1.5 shows the result and we can see most of coefficients for independent variables,
including capital flight, are similar to previous results. It confirms the previous conclu-
sions that 1) capital flight does not depress real GDP growth and domestic investment
in emerging market economies and 2) capital inflow stops and capital outflow flights are
different phenomena.
1.4.3 Interaction model
In the previous section, it was assumed the impact of flights is linear and not
affected by the amount of gross capital inflows. This section tests the hypothesis that
the impact varies according to available external loans in the country. For example,
if domestic companies can simply borrow from foreign countries during capital flights,
the loss of investment by domestic agents can be quickly recovered and the impact of
flights can be minimized. High correlation between inflows and outflows in emerging
markets (Broner et al, 2013) also supports this hypothesis because it indicates domestic
companies increase foreign borrowings while domestic agents purchase a large amount
17
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of foreign assets. The model is
yit =β1flightit + β2stopit + β3flightit ∗ stopit +X ′itγ + uit (1.4)
where the dependent variable, y, is real GDP growth and total investment as well.
Table 1.6 shows the result on real GDP growth and total investment. When the
dependent variable is real GDP growth, constitutive terms of flights (β̂1) in all estimators
are positive. Moreover, a single flight does not depress total investment as well. They,
therefore, confirm the previous result from linear models that a flight alone is not
harmful to the domestic economy. Nonetheless, negative interaction terms (β̂3), when
the dependent variable is GDP growth, suggest flights might depress domestic growth if
there is “capital flee” from domestic financial markets not only by domestic investors but
also by foreign investors. On the contrary, it is interesting to see that interaction terms
vary when the dependent variable is total investment. This might indicate domestic
investment does not depress even if flights and stops occur simultaneously, which is
counterintuitive. Further study is warranted on this issue. Indeed, Section 1.4.4 shows
that domestic investment has been severely depressed when two capital flow episodes
occurred simultaneously in emerging market economies. Lastly, there is little change in
the coefficients of other independent variables.
For further analysis, an alternative specification is employed, which replaces
flight dummies with gross capital outflows. The model is
yit =β1outflowit + β2stopit + β3outflowit ∗ stopit +X ′itγ + uit (1.5)
The estimates are reported in Table 1.7.
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There is no significant difference from previous results. βˆ1s are mostly positive
and insignificant, which indicates gross capital outflows hardly hurt domestic economies.
On the other hand, βˆ2s are negative with all estimators and the impact is especially
strong on domestic investment. If we see the interaction term, which shows the impact
of gross capital outflows during capital stops, although βˆ3s are negative when GDP
growth is the dependent variable, the sign of it changes according to estimators when
total investment is the dependent variable. While it supports the previous result that
capital flights are harmful under the presence of capital stops, it also suggests even a
small amount of gross capital outflows depress the economies when there are not enough
external loans. For example, the result from OGMM shows that 1% (of GDP) increase
in gross capital outflows may decrease about 0.44% of real GDP growth in the short run
if there are not enough financial resources. In sum, the results from Table 1.6 and Table
1.7 demonstrate policymakers have to manage both gross capital inflows and outflows
to prevent the damage caused by domestic investors fleeing from domestic markets.
Although the result from interaction models ratify the hypothesis that capital
flights are harmful conditional on the existence of capital stops to some extent, insignifi-
cant interaction terms make it suggestive rather than conclusive. In order to understand
why, it is worth noting the feature of interaction models. which is multicollinearity be-
tween constitutive terms and interaction terms. For instance, the interaction terms of
two constitutive terms (capital stops and flights in (1.4) and gross capital outflows and
capital stops in (1.5)) are simply the intersection or the product of them. As a result,
standard errors of the coefficients are inflated and, in many cases, they contribute to
22
the coefficients being insignificant. Furthermore, a small number of interaction terms
worsens this issue. Although a few papers have suggested the solutions, to my knowl-
edge, there is no consensus. However, as Friedrich (1982) and Brambor et al. (2006)
argue, it is desirable to use it if there is any chance that interaction is present because
it provides additional information that cannot be discovered by a linear-additive model.
For this reason, the next subsection uses time trend models. It complements the result
here by showing that GDP growth and total investment actually have decreased when
flights concurred with stops.
1.4.4 Time trend model
This subsection employs time trend models to investigate how growth and
investment have evolved around the capital flight events. To be specific, flight episodes
are now separated into two different groups: the ones that concurred with capital stops
and the ones that occurred alone. That is,
{Flights} = {Flights w/ Stops} ∪ {Flights only}
and
{Flights w/ Stops} ∩ {Flights only} = ∅.
The model is
yit = α+
∑
0≤s≤4
βsepisode
j
i,t−2+s + γyear + ηi + it (1.6)
where j is an index for two groups of flights: {flights w/ stops} and {flights only}. ‘year’
is the time trend to get rid of linear trend in GDP growth and investment. Therefore,
23
the model estimates the behavior of real GDP growth and total investment around two
events from T-2 to T+2 where T is the year when the event occurred.
Table 1.8 reports the result and Figure 1.4 summarizes it. It is noteworthy
that the behavior of real GDP growth and domestic investment around capital flights
are starkly different according to the presence of capital stops. For example, during
simultaneous flights and stops, GDP growth gets the lowest at T-1 and begins to recover
slowly after that. Likewise, total investment gets the lowest at T when two events occur
simultaneously. In other words, GDP growth has decreased about 1.8% compared to
GDP growth two years before the event and it took two years to recover fully. The
damage to domestic investment is worse. Domestic investment has decreased about
3.4% of GDP compared to domestic investment two years before the event. Moreover,
it is not fully recovered even two years after the event, which indicates it takes longer
to recover from the shocks.
On the other hand, there is little change in both when flights occur alone.
Although domestic investment slightly decreased during single flight periods, it was al-
ready at a low level at T-2 so it is doubtful that they played a major role in domestic
investment at T. The result from the time trend models, therefore, confirms the hy-
pothesis that the impact of flights are conditional on available external loans. It shows
emerging markets are the most damaged when flights and stops occur simultaneously.
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Figure 1.4: The trend of real GDP growth and total investment around episodes
1.5 Summary and concluding remarks
The essay has estimated the causal effect of capital flights on emerging market
economies employing diverse GMM estimators. Moreover, it adopted interaction models
and time trend models to test the hypothesis that the causal effect might be conditional
on the amount of gross capital inflows available for working capital. This differs from
previous research that focused on the association and assumed the impact of flights
is linear. As a result, the essay provides quite a different conclusion. Namely, flights
alone do not depress emerging markets’ growth and investment. This differs from the
effect of capital inflow stops by foreigners, which has consistently depressed domestic
economies. On the other hand, capital flights coinciding with sudden capital stops have
worsened the shocks and we could see that the growth and investment were severely
affected by them. It suggests flights could be still dangerous if domestic companies and
banks cannot have access to international credit markets.
The result necessitates us to see capital flights from a new angle and makes
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Table 1.8: The trend of real GDP growth and total investment around episodes
Real GDP growth Total investment
Flights w/ Stops Flights only Flights w/ Stops Flights only
T-2 -0.4397 -0.3549 -0.6036 -0.9715*
(1.1359) (0.4318) (1.363) (0.4955)
T-1 -4.1767*** -0.1695 -2.462* -1.1374**
(1.1689) (0.4519) (1.4028) (0.5189)
T -2.2541** 0.1787 -4.0543*** -1.997***
(1.1367) (0.4595) (1.3645) (0.5249)
T+1 -0.4853 0.6487 -2.641* -0.075
(1.135) (0.4619) (1.3623) (0.5275)
T+2 0.6218 0.5171 -1.8576 -0.9023*
(1.059) (0.4573) (1.271) (0.5223)
Wald test
yt−1 − yt−2 -3.737** 0.1854 -1.8584 -0.1629
yt − yt−1 1.9226 0.3482 -1.5923 -0.8596
yt+1 − yt 1.7688 0.47 1.4133 1.922**
yt+2 − yt+1 1.1071 -0.1316 0.7834 -0.8273
yt − yt−2 -1.8144 0.5336 -3.4507* -1.0255
yt+2 − yt 2.8759* 0.3384 2.1967 1.0947
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1348 0.1242 0.4947 0.5552
Countries 56 56 55 55
Observations 1,155 1,044 1,139 1,023
Notes: Constant terms are not reported. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *, **, and ***
for significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
us to ponder the implementation of appropriate capital outflow policies such as capital
outflow restrictions. Liberalized capital markets allow domestic agents to diversify their
portfolios while reducing the risks and to take advantage of foreign investment. However,
if the benefits are by the loss of the country’s investment and growth, social welfare
would eventually decrease as a consequence. The essay denies such possibility and
argues that more liberalized gross capital outflows are beneficial for emerging market
economies.
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Nonetheless, note that the main conclusion of this essay is not that capital
flights do not necessarily harm emerging markets or are negligible, because they still
might affect the countries through diverse channels. For example, capital flights may
indicate domestic investors’ currency attacks on their own currency to depreciate it. In
this case, the country might experience currency crises and inflation crises and its growth
may decrease as a result. Another important caveat is that capital flights might be
associated with capital inflow surges. As emphasized in this essay, domestic investment
is severely depressed if companies cannot borrow not only from domestic agents but
also from foreigners. Therefore, they would be tempted to increase foreign borrowings
if they observe domestic agents fleeing from domestic markets. The country might then
experience “capital inflow bonanzas” and subsequent financial crises (see Reinhart and
Reinhart (2008) and Ghosh et al. (2016)).
The intuitions above suggest a future research agenda on gross capital outflows.
Although there has been significant research on capital inflow reversals, there still re-
mains relatively little research on capital outflow flights caused by domestic agents.
Considering the increasing role of capital outflows in emerging market economies, bet-
ter knowledge on this phenomenon would help the design and implementation of sound
policies.
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Chapter 2
The heterogenous effects of saving and
capital inflows on capital outflows: a
quantile regression approach
2.1 Introduction
What is the main driver of gross capital outflows in developing countries?
Although capital outflows are generally fueled by domestic and external saving, the
answer to this suggests different policy implications especially when domestic agents
are purchasing a large amount of foreign assets (capital flight). Capital flight might be
harmful but the reason why would be different according to its main fuel. For example, if
domestic agents are saving in foreign countries to avoid expected taxation, governments’
tax base erodes and social welfare might be reduced consequently (Dooley and Kletzer,
1994). Conversely, if they borrow from foreign countries to increase leverage, such
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behaviors might increase the probability of external default and sudden stops in the
country (Gosh et al., 2016). In either case, different policy responses may be required.
As one way to answer it, I investigate the causal effects of private saving
and gross capital inflows on gross capital outflows using panel data that consists of
56 emerging market economies over 1990 - 2014. In particular, it focuses on extreme
movements of capital flows that may motivate the implementation of macroprudential
policies. Recent literature has provided empirical evidence that capital inflows and
outflows are both pro-cyclical (e.g., Broner et al., 2013). This might indicate that capital
outflows are mainly fueled by external loans rather than by domestic saving especially
during boom times. Accordingly, the essay tests two hypotheses: first, capital outflows
are mostly fueled by capital inflows rather than by domestic saving and, second, the
causal impact of capital inflows are stronger than that of domestic saving especially
during capital flight.
Using Powell’s (2015) quantile regression methodology, it sheds light on the
relationship between capital outflows and their two main resources. First, it estimates
quantile treatment effects of gross capital inflows and domestic saving that might vary
according to the distribution of gross capital outflows. It is motivated by the procycli-
cal nature of capital flows which, in turn, might indicate their varying association with
capital inflows. Moreover, according to Forbes and Warnock (2012a, b), the determi-
nants of capital flight (large foreign asset purchases by domestic agents) and capital
retrenchment (small foreign asset purchases) are different. It implies capital flight and
retrenchment are different phenomena and that the causal impacts of capital inflows
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and private saving on them also might be different. Ordinary least squares methods
estimate the mean effects of the determinants but do not allow for heterogenous effects
at different points in the conditional distribution of the outcome variable. If this is the
case for gross capital outflows, OLS models are inappropriate to estimate the impact
of two financial resources. On the other hand, quantile regression methodology can
provide more robust evidence on the impacts of them when outflows are far from the
mean or median.
A quantile plot (Figure 2.1) and the summary (Table 2.1) of gross capital
outflows also support the desirability of the methodology in this circumstance. Across
diverse fractions of the data, gross capital outflows range from -15.04% to 50.81% and
even after getting rid of outliers, they range from -2.2% to 12.01%. Therefore, the essay
attempts to estimate the impacts of two financial resources across the fraction of gross
capital outflows.
Table 2.1: The summary and quantiles of gross capital outflows (% of GDP)
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1,298 2.84% 4.81 -15.04% 50.81%
Quantile
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
-2.2% 0.17% 1.72% 4.44% 12.01%
Notes: Data source is IMF BOPS and WEO, and the data
consist of 56 emerging markets and cover the years 1990 - 2014
Second, I estimate the causal impacts of domestic saving and capital inflows
on capital outflows. Addressing causality is important for the study because the asso-
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Figure 2.1: Quantile plot of gross capital outflows (IMF BOPS and WEO)
ciation might simply reflect national income accounting in sample countries (i.e., total
saving=total investment). In this case, the association between gross capital outflows
and two resources would barely vary across the distribution of the former unless there
exist large errors and omissions in the data. 1 Powell (2015) adopts Chernozhukov and
Hansen’s (2005) IV quantile regression methodology and, therefore allows us to estimate
not only the association but also causal effects of the determinants.
According to the result, the marginal effect of external loans on foreign asset
purchases is analogous to that of saving when private sectors are purchasing a small
amount of foreign assets (e.g., less than the median). However, when asset purchases
significantly increase, they switch their resources in favor of external loans and reduce
1To confirm it, see the result in Section 2.5.1.
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the dependency on saving. It suggests capital flight is fueled by borrowing rather than
by saving and it might be a reason why capital inflows are strongly and positively
correlated with capital outflows. Furthermore, the impacts of two financial resources on
equity outflows and debts outflows are quite different. By showing the past outflows are
the best predictor of current equity outflows, the estimates indicate equity outflows are
very persistent during capital flight. As a result, although the temporary effect of capital
inflows is small, the permanent effect becomes significantly large. On the contrary, debt
outflows are less persistent than equity outflows but quantile treatment effects of current
determinants are larger. It indicates private sectors overborrow to purchase debts rather
than equities in the short run and is consistent with several stylized facts (e.g., high
leverage ratio and procyclicality of capital flows and financial systems).
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature on the
relationship between capital outflows and two financial resources, saving and borrowing.
Section 3 describes Powell’s (2015) IV quantile regression for panel data. Section 4
explains data and introduces regression models and Section 5 reports the results. Section
6 summarizes the essay and concludes it by discussing some policy implications.
2.2 Related literature
We might be able to surmise the impact of private saving on foreign invest-
ment by a well-known stylized fact, “Home equity bias”. According to Feldstein and
Horioka (1980), the empirical evidence indicates saving is mostly spent to purchase
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domestic capital stock rather than foreign capital stock. Their results suggest very
strong correlation between saving and domestic investment: one percentage increase
in the saving rate increases almost one percentage investment rate. After their study,
researchers consistently have attempted to test “home equity bias” and many of them
have confirmed it.2 Furthermore, recent empirical literature argues this phenomenon is
not restricted to developed countries and equities. Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) show
such bias is stronger and more persistent in emerging markets and the share of home
bonds and bank loans in investors’ portfolios are also higher. Feldstein (1995) also stud-
ies the relationship between capital outflows and domestic investment by investigating
how outbound FDI affects domestic capital stock in 24 OECD countries. According to
him, one dollar spending on outbound FDI is associated with a decrease in domestic
investment by almost the same amount so that they are substitutes. If such strong
correlation between saving and domestic investment holds, we should expect the causal
effect of saving on capital outflows is small. However, this long-term relationship be-
tween saving and domestic investment does not confirm the causal effect of saving on
foreign investment in the short term which is the main purpose of this essay.
On the other hand, other researchers have focused on the simultaneous capital
inflows and outflows in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s and tried to explain this
strong correlation by modeling domestic risks that are unique in developing countries.
For example, Khan and Ul Haque (1985) argue it is because of the “expropriation”
risk that cannot be hedged because of political instability and poor infrastructures in
2See e.g., Feldstein (1982), Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991), and Tesar (1991).
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developing countries. As a result, private sectors prefer to purchase risk-free foreign
assets and governments are forced to borrow from external markets. Similarly, Alesina
and Tabelini (1989) point out political uncertainty as a reason for the association.
According to them, noncooperative two social groups cause governments’ moral hazard
to borrow excessively before the change of the terms. Therefore, individuals who are
afraid of the increase in tax in the future purchase foreign assets as the insurance
against it. These papers suggest theoretical frameworks as to why large capital inflows
are associated with capital flight.
Recent studies also provide the empirical evidence on strong positive corre-
lation between capital inflows and outflows. For instance, Broner et al. (2013) show
there is strong positive correlation between capital inflows and outflows regardless of
countries’ incomes and argue the correlation is getting stronger. Likewise, Rey (2013)
and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey’s (2015) results emphasize strong correlation between
two flows and point out global common factors, such as global risk aversion and growth
as the main drivers of this strong correlation. This might indicate capital inflows are
the main drivers of capital outflows. Providing a detailed interpretation on this strong
correlation is one of the purposes of this essay.
To my knowledge, this essay is one of few studies employing quantile regression
to estimate the impacts of private saving and gross capital inflows on gross capital
outflows. The main motive is to treat capital outflows at different quantiles as different
dependent variables. Forbes and Warnock (2012a, b) argue the determinants of capital
retrenchment and flight are different. According to them, global common factors are
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the main determinants of capital flight although domestic specific factors also play some
roles. It implies they are indeed different phenomena. If so, the causal effects of private
saving and capital inflows on capital outflows may be different according to the amount
of them and then the quantile regression methodology allows us to estimate them. I
expect its result could suggest more flexible policy responses according to the amount
of capital outflows.
2.3 Quantile regression with nonadditive fixed effects
This section summarizes Powell’s (2015) quantile regression with nonadditive
fixed effect. Powell (2015) suggests not to estimate fixed effects separately in the model
being concerned that the distribution of outcome variable, Yit , changes after condi-
tioning on fixed effects, αi: i.e., Yit|Dit 6= (Yit − αi)|Dit.3 As each country’s fixed
characteristics might explain a certain amount of capital flows, it could be more desir-
able to leave them as a part of the disturbance terms, which decide the rank of Yit.
4
By not estimating fixed effects, computational gains are large but any fixed components
in the instruments are eliminated in the sample moments using generalized method of
moments (GMM). Furthermore, by developing Chernozhukov and Hansen’s (2005) IV
quantile regression approach, it allows using instruments to estimate treatment effects
with more simplified assumptions using the panel nature of the data. Parameter identi-
3Following Chernozhukov and Hansen’s (2005) notation, I use capital letters to designate random
variables and lowercase letters for realized values in the random variable.
4For quantile regression with fixed effects, see Koenker (2004), Ponomareva (2011), and Galvao
(2011).
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fication is solely done by within-individual variations in the instruments. In this section,
I mostly focus on necessary assumptions and the estimation process of quantile regres-
sion. For a detailed explanation on it (e.g., properties and proofs), see Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2005) and Powell (2015).
2.3.1 The basic framework
Potential outcomes are modeled using the linear-in-parameters framework;
that is,
Yit = D
′
itβ(U
∗
it), Uit ∼ U(0, 1) (2.1)
where D
′
itβ(τ) is strictly increasing in τ . Outcomes are latent (potential) in the sense
that we can only observe a part of them given d: Y dit = q(d, U
d∗
it ). The disturbance
term, U∗it, is normalized in the uniform distribution and let U
∗
it = f(αi, Uit), where
Uit ∼ U(0, 1): i.e., it is the function of fixed components and time-varying components.
The model does not require a specific form of f(·) except it exists. As Ud∗ determines
relative rankings of realized values of potential outcomes, it is referred to as the rank
variable. It can also be interpreted as “ability” or “proneness” (Doksum, 1974) because
U∗it in the upper quantile implies people are more prone to purchase foreign assets. In
this model, quantile treatment effects (QTEs) are the causal effect of the treatment
variables from d1 to d2 on Yit holding τ fixed:
d
′
2β(τ)− d
′
1β(τ) (2.2)
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The structural quantile function (SQF) that describes the τ th quantile of Y for a given
d is
SY (τ |d) = d′β(τ), τ ∈ (0, 1) (2.3)
On the contrary, the SQF with fixed effect is SY (τ˜ |d, αi) = αi + d′ β˜(τ˜). It is clear that
τ˜ 6= τ so that β˜(τ˜) 6= β(τ). Finally, quantile regression relies on two restrictions: the
conditional restriction, (4), and the unconditional restriction, (5):
P (Yit ≤ D′itβ(τ)|Di) = P (Yis ≤ D
′
isβ(τ)|Di) (2.4)
P (Yit ≤ D′itβ(τ)) = τ (2.5)
where Di = (Di1, · · · , DiT ). The conditional restriction is especially notable because
the probability that the potential outcome is less than the estimated model varies across
individuals. The estimator only uses within-individual comparisons of the probability
and it is possible by observing the same individual several times using panel data.
2.3.2 Assumptions
All conditions are assumed to hold jointly with probability one.
A1 Potential Outcomes and Monotonicity: Y dit = q(d, U
d∗
it ), U
d∗
it ∼ U(0, 1),
where q(d, τ) is strictly increasing in τ .
A1 is a standard monotinicity condition from Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005).
Ud∗it is a normalized disturbance term that may be a function of several unobservable
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disturbance terms. Let d∗it be a non-normalized disturbance term, then there exists
one-to-one mapping of d∗it to U
d∗
it .
A2 Independence: E
[
1(Ud∗it ≤ τ)−1(Ud∗is ≤ τ)|Zi
]
= 0 for all s, t and for each
d.
Zi = (Zi1, · · · , ZiT ) is the set of instruments. A2 is satisfied under conditional
and unconditional restrictions and requires instruments do not systemically change the
distribution of Ud∗it over time. It relaxes Chernozhukov and Hansen’s (2005) assumption,
which is E
[
1(Ud∗it ≤ τ)|Zit
]
= τ .
A3 Selection: Dit = δt(Zi, Vi) for some unknown funtion δt(·) and random
vector Vi.
A3 defines the function of a treatment variable and it is the function of in-
struments and some random vectors. This structure ensures Zi is a valid instrument
and the relationship between Dit and Vi necessitates using Zi.
A4 Rank Similarity: Ud∗it |Zi, Vi ∼ Ud
′∗
it |Zi, Vi for each d, d
′
.
A4 is the most important assumption. According to it, a country that is al-
ready purchasing a large amount of assets (highly ranked) still tends to purchase a large
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amount of them with changes in saving or loans compared to the others.5 The stronger
assumption is rank invariance but the rank similarity condition relaxes it by allowing
the ranks to change. It only requires such change is not systematic.
A5 Observables: The observed random vector consists of Yit ≡ Y Dit , Dit, Zit
Conditions A1-A5 lead to the following main results:
Theorem: Suppose A1-A5 hold. Then, the following three conditions hold
with probability one:
1. For U∗it := U
D∗
it , Yit = q(Dit, U
∗
it), U
∗
it ∼ U(0, 1).
2. For each τ ∈ (0, 1), E
[
1(Yit ≤ q(Dit, τ))− 1(Yis ≤ q(Dis, τ))|Zi
]
= 0 for all s, t.
3. For each τ ∈ (0, 1), P
[
Yit ≤ q(Dit, τ)
]
= τ .
Condition 1 states a quantile regression model with a nonadditive disturbance term
is generated by A1-A5. Condition 2 and 3 provide two moment conditions that are
needed for GMM estimation. The two moment conditions are:
5That is, the rank of outcomes does not change systematically by realized treatment variables.
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Moment Conditions: Suppose A1-A5 hold. Then for each τ ∈ (0, 1),
E
{
1
2T 2
∑
t
∑
s
(Zit − Zis)
[
1(Yit ≤ q(Dit, τ))− 1(Yis ≤ q(Dis, τ))
]}
(2.6)
E
[
1(Yit ≤ q(Dit, τ))− τ
]
= 0 (2.7)
Moment condition (2.6) can be simplified as
E
{
1
T
∑
t
(Zit − Z¯i)
[
1(Yit ≤ q(Dit, τ))
]}
= 0 (2.8)
where Z¯i =
1
T
∑T
t=1 Zit. It shows that identification is solely done by within-individual
variation in the instruments: Zit − Z¯i.
2.3.3 Estimation
GMM is used for the estimation. Simplified sample moments for the practical
estimation are
gˆ(b) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(b) with gi(b) =
1
T
{
T∑
t=1
(Zit − Z¯i)
[
1(Yit ≤ D′itb)
]}
(2.9)
If time fixed effects are included, moment conditions (2.6) and (2.7) imply P (Yit ≤
D
′
itβ(τ)) = τ for all t. Powell (2015) defines the parameter set as
B ≡
{
b | τ − 1
N
<
1
N
N∑
i=1
1(Yit ≤ D′itb) ≤ τ for all t
}
(2.10)
to force Yit ≤ D′itb to hold for 100τ% of the observations in each time period. Then,
β̂(τ) = argmin
b∈B
gˆ(b)
′
Aˆgˆ(b) (2.11)
with a weighting matrix Aˆ. Aˆ is an identity matrix in one-step GMM and two-step
GMM is possible if the model is overidentified.
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As traditional GMM estimators, including time fixed effects is important be-
cause it allows the interpretation of panel quantile regression estimates to be equivalent
to the interpretation of cross-sectional quantile regression estimates. For example, with-
out shifting the distribution of capital flows every year, the upper quantiles mostly will
belong to later year periods. Let D ≡ (X, 1(t = 1), ..., 1(t = T )), where X is the set
of independent variables and 1(t=s) is a dummy variable for time at s. Let b˜ represent
coefficients on X such that D
′
itb = γt + X
′
itb˜ and
set γˆt(τ, b˜) such that τ − 1
N
<
1
N
N∑
i
1(Yit −X ′itb˜ ≤ γˆt(τ, b˜)) ≤ τ. (2.12)
γˆt(τ, b˜) that satisfies (2.12) is the τ
th quantile of the distribution of Yit −X′itb˜ at time
t. The steps to estimate b is as follows:
1. Calculate the year fixed effects to constrain the parameter set to B.
2. Evaluate the objective function, −N2 gˆ(b)
′
Aˆgˆ(b), where gi(b) is defined in (2.9).
3. b that maximizes −N2 gˆ(b)
′
Aˆgˆ(b) is β̂(τ).
Although the process is clear, it is easier said than done because, in many cases, the
objective function −N2 gˆ(b)
′
Aˆgˆ(b) is non-convex and has many local optima even when
the global optimum is well-defined (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003). Powell (2015)
suggests using adaptive Markov Chain Monte Carlo to estimate β̂(τ) by drawing b
from the quasi-posterior density of parameters. Appendix B.1 explains the AMCMC
algorithm that was used for the estimation in the essay.
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2.4 Data and estimation strategy
2.4.1 Data
Unbalanced panel data consists of 56 emerging market economies from 1990 to
2014 excluding (1) major oil-exporting countries, (2) bank havens, and (3) low-income
groups according to 2008 GNI per capita by the World Bank, considering they might
work as strong outliers in the group.6 All countries have at least total 15 years and 10
consecutive years of gross capital outflows data (source: IMF BOPS). As it is specified
in other papers, IMF data does not clarify whether some missing values in outflows are
zero or not available. Following others, (e.g., Forbes and Warnock, 2012a) I replace
them with zero if the surrounding values are zeros or leave them empty, otherwise.7
Selected variables for estimation are: gross capital outflows (outflow) for the depen-
dent variable, gross capital inflows (inflow), private saving (prsave), and exchange rate
regime (exregime) for the explanatory variables, and real GDP growth (zgdp), capi-
tal market openness (kaopen), public saving (pubsave), and domestic credit to private
sector (credit) for the instrumental variables. I also added the lagged dependent vari-
able as an explanatory variable to estimate the permanent effects of other independent
variables. The details on data sources and the definition of variables are in Appendix
6The sample countries are: Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, The Rep. of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivore, Dominica, The Domini-
can Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania,, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mo-
rocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saint Lucia,
Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
7One of the strengths of quantile regression is that estimated QTEs are robust to this kind of
censoring.
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B.2.8
The followings is the summary of selected variables and the correlations be-
tween them. As Table 2.3 shows us, gross capital inflows is the only variable that
is strongly correlated with gross capital outflows. On the other hand, the correlation
between private saving and gross capital outflows is very small, as home bias implies,
and it gives us a clue that the impact of it on capital outflows might be insignificant.
Private saving and gross capital inflows are negatively correlated, which confirms saving
decreases as people borrow more. Finally, endogenous variables (gross capital inflows
and private saving) and instrumental variables (real GDP growth, capital market open-
ness, public saving, and domestic credit) are strongly correlated, which indicates the
instruments can represent instrumented variables.
Table 2.2: The summary of selected variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gross capital outflows (% of GDP) 1,298 2.84% 4.81 -15.04% 50.81%
Gross capital inflows (% of GDP) 1,326 6.45% 8.53 -38.98% 71.01%
Private saving (% of GDP) 1,061 13.50% 11.48 -69.27% 61.76%
Exchange rate regime 1,400 7.36% 4.22 1 15
Real GDP growth (%) 1,355 3.78% 4.71 -30.90% 25.78%
Capital market openness 1,321 0.45 0.33 0 1
Public saving (% of GDP) 1,073 6.31% 11.68 -55.68% 75.71%
Domestic credit (% of GDP) 1,302 38.05% 28.83 0% 166.50%
8As you can see in Appendix B.2, I used Chinn and Ito’s (2006) aggregate control index and this
is to prevent observations from being reduced only by the index. As the dependent variable is gross
capital outflows, the outflow control index will give better information for the estimation but using it
significantly decreases available observations. For example, Ferna´ndez et al.’s (2016) outflow control
index decreases the number of observations from 1,321 to 740.
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Table 2.3: The correlations between selected variables
outflow inflow prsave exregime zgdp kaopen pubsave credit
outflow 1.0000
inflow 0.4000 1.0000
prsave -0.0023 -0.3563 1.0000
exregime -0.0958 -0.1290 0.1726 1.0000
zgdp 0.0850 0.1364 -0.0375 -0.0020 1.0000
kaopen -0.0181 0.1669 -0.0362 -0.0032 0.0187 1.0000
pubsave 0.1322 0.2276 -0.6753 -0.0977 0.2695 0.0239 1.0000
credit 0.0952 0.1500 0.1100 -0.0046 -0.0940 -0.0149 -0.0726 1.0000
Notes: outflow: gross capital outflows, inflow: gross capital inflows, prsave: private saving, exregime:
exchange rate regime, zgdp: real GDP growth, kaopen: capital market openness, pubsave: public saving,
credit: domestic credit
2.4.2 Estimation strategy
To estimate the association between the dependent variable and explanatory
variables, I use quantile regression methodology to estimate quantile treatment effects
across every 5th quantile of gross capital outflows (from 0.05 to 0.9). As is described in
Section 2.3, the model is a linear quantile regression, which is
Yit = D
′
itβ(τ) (2.13)
where Y is the dependent variable (gross capital outflows), D is the set of explanatory
variables (lagged dependent variable, gross capital inflows, private saving, and exchange
rate regime) and, τ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65,
0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9}. The result from the OLS is also provided to see how quantile
treatment effects are different from the mean effect in each quantile.9 The basic OLS
9However, it is worth noting that the results from OLS regression and quantile regression are not
one-to-one comparable because their regression strategies are different. Unlike the OLS estimators,
Powell’s (2015) quantile regression method is the maximum likelihood estimator.
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model is
outflowit = β0 + β1loutflowit + β2inflowit + β3prsaveit
+ β4exregimeit + αi + γt + it
(2.14)
where loutflowit is the lagged dependent variable for country i at time t. βs are esti-
mated using the fixed effect model so the constant term β0 and individual fixed effects
αi disappear. β2 and β3, which represent the association between capital outflows and
other two resources, are our main interests. Moreover, adopting the dynamic model al-
lows us to estimate permanent effects of two variables, which are β2/(1−β1) for capital
inflows and β3/(1− β1) for saving, respectively. According to (2.13), the corresponding
quantile regression (QR) can be expressed as
outflowit(τ) = q(Dit, τ)
= β1(τ)loutflowit + β2(τ)inflowit + β3(τ)prsaveit
+ β4(τ)exregimeit + γt(τ)
(2.15)
where q(Dit, τ) is the τth quantile function of capital outflows. There exits one-to-one
mapping of it to the normalized disturbance term, Uit, so that τth quantile can be
interpreted as the τth quantile of Uit.
Next, to estimate the causal effects of explanatory variables, I use the same
quantile regression with four instruments (real GDP growth, capital market openness,
public saving, and domestic credit) for gross capital inflows and private saving, as these
two variables are in main interests.10 For the mean effect, I use two-stage least squares
with fixed effect (FE2SLS). The models for FE2SLS and IVQR are the same as FEOLS
10On the other hand, exchange rate regime instruments itself.
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and QR except they use instruments. As is done for the association, the mean effect by
FE2SLS and quantile treatment effects by IVQR will be compared with each other.
As I argued before, a quantile regression method allows us to test more diverse
hypotheses than an OLS regression method does. There are three hypotheses to test
for the purpose of the study. First, the causal impact of capital inflows on capital
outflows is stronger during capital flight: β2(τ
′) ≥ β2(τ) if τ ′ > τ . Second, the causal
impact of capital inflows on outflows is stronger than that of saving: β2(τ) ≥ β3(τ).
Third, the impact of saving on capital outflows, therefore, might be similar to the mean
effect during capital flight: β3(τ) ≈ β3 for τ ∈ [0.5, 0.9]. Moreover, the nature of
the dynamic model allows us to test the same hypotheses for permanent impacts: (1)
β2(τ ′)
1−β1(τ ′) ≥
β2(τ)
1−β1(τ) if τ
′ > τ , (2) β2(τ)1−β1(τ) ≥
β3(τ)
1−β1(τ) , and (3)
β3(τ)
1−β1(τ) ≈
β3
1−β1 for τ ∈
[0.5, 0.9].11 The interpretations of the result in Section 2.5 will be based on these total
six hypotheses.
Additionally, for the detailed analysis, I separate gross capital outflows into
gross equity outflows (FDIs + portfolio equities) and gross debt outflows (portfolio
debts + other investments). Although they are frequently aggregated as gross capital
outflows, the characteristics of two capital flows might be quite different because debt
flows are larger and more volatile than equity flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012b).12
Therefore, the impacts of private saving and capital inflows on equity outflows and
debt outflows might be different so the answers to the hypotheses are different. For
11If three hypotheses for temporary effects are true, it is sufficient to show that β1(τ
′) ≥ β1(τ) and
β1(τ) ≥ β1 for (1) and (3), respectively. (2) necessarily holds if β2(τ) ≥ β3(τ).
12In the data, the mean and standard deviation of equity outflows and debt outflows are 0.62% and
1.61, and 2.24% and 4.3, respectively.
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this reason, I regard two kinds of capital outflows as different dependent variables and
estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on them using the same models used
for gross capital outflows. To be specific, OLS models for gross equity outflows and debt
outflows are
equityit = β0 + β1lequityit + β2inflowit + β3prsaveit
+ β4exregimeit + αi + γt + it
(2.16)
debtit = β0 + β1ldebtit + β2inflowit + β3prsaveit
+ β4exregimeit + αi + γt + it
(2.17)
where equityit and debtit are gross equity outflows and gross debt outflows for country
i at time t, respectively. Accordingly, QR models are
equityit(τ) = q(Dit, τ)equity
= β1(τ)lequityit + β2(τ)inflowit + β3(τ)prsaveit
+ β4(τ)exregimeit + γt(τ)
(2.18)
debtit(τ) = q(Dit, τ)debt
= β1(τ)ldebtit + β2(τ)inflowit + β3(τ)prsaveit
+ β4(τ)exregimeit + γt(τ)
(2.19)
where q(Dit, τ)equity and q(Dit, τ)debt are the τth quantile functions of equity outflows
and debt outflows, respectively.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Fixed effect model and quantile regression model
2.5.1.1 Gross capital outflows
The results from FEOLS and QR are reported in Table 2.4 and summarized
in Figure 2.2. First, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable from QR is sim-
ilar to the one from FEOLS until the median but gets larger after it, which indicates
foreign asset purchases become more persistent during capital flight. As a result, the
permanent effects of explanatory variables also become larger in the upper quantiles.
Second, the coefficient of gross capital inflows gets larger in the upper quantiles, too,
but the difference is not significant and none of them is larger than the coefficient from
FEOLS. It is, therefore, not clear whether the effect of capital inflows on outflows is
stronger during capital flight. However, because of the persistence in the upper quan-
tiles, the permanent effect of capital inflows is certainly larger in the upper quantiles.
For example, a 1% increase in gross capital inflows is associated with only 0.1% increase
in gross capital outflows at 0.05th quantile but it is about 0.33% at 0.9th quantile. It
might suggest the permanent effect of capital inflows is stronger when there are large
foreign asset purchases.
On the contrary, the association between private saving and capital outflows
is weak at any quantile and all of them (including FEOLS) are less than 0.1. It implies
saving and capital outflows are weakly associated and it might indicate home bias holds
in the short term even during capital flight. One interesting feature is that the coefficient
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is actually larger at lower quantiles but it gets smaller when capital outflows are larger
than the median. A 1% increase in private saving at 0.3th quantile is associated with
0.12% permanent increase in capital outflows but it is only 0.07% at 0.7th quantile.
Summarizing the results, the association between capital outflows and the
other two variables is not substantially different in the lower quantiles but the association
between capital outflows and inflows becomes stronger in the upper quantiles. This
might indicate private sectors use external loans rather than private saving when they
attempt to increase foreign asset holdings significantly. They support the second and
third hypotheses for temporary and permanent effects but it is suggestive rather than
conclusive until causal effects are estimated. Moreover, as was concerned before, the
association does not vary much across the quantiles. Therefore, the first hypothesis
that the impact of capital inflows on outflows is stronger in the upper quantiles is still
inconclusive.
Lastly, the coefficient of exchange rate regime is negative in the lower quantiles
but steadily increases and becomes positive in the upper quantiles. It indicates investors
prefer fixed regimes when they purchase a small amount of foreign assets but prefer a
floating regime when purchases are large. On the one hand, the floating exchange
rate increases the risk but, on the other hand, it provides an arbitrage opportunity by
changing expected future asset price. The result suggests the latter is a stronger motive
during capital flight.13
13This trend of QTEs for exchange rate regime does rarely change with other estimators.
49
T
ab
le
2.
4:
T
h
e
a
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
g
ro
ss
ca
p
it
al
ou
tfl
ow
s
an
d
se
le
ct
ed
va
ri
ab
le
s:
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
re
gr
es
si
on
an
d
q
u
an
ti
le
re
gr
es
si
on
Q
u
an
ti
le
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
F
E
O
L
S
0.
05
0.
1
0.
15
0.
2
0.
25
0.
3
0.
35
0.
4
0.
45
L
O
U
T
F
L
O
W
0.
27
72
**
*
0.
29
48
**
*
0.
25
59
**
*
0.
27
47
**
*
0.
25
92
**
*
0.
25
01
**
*
0.
24
41
**
*
0.
23
14
**
*
0.
26
62
**
*
0
.2
56
8*
*
*
(0
.0
70
1)
(0
.0
42
3)
(0
.0
39
3)
(0
.0
31
4)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
26
3)
(0
.0
24
9)
(0
.0
27
2)
(0
.0
27
3)
(0
.0
2
4
8)
IN
F
L
O
W
0
.2
37
5*
**
0.
07
15
**
*
0.
12
81
**
*
0.
14
49
**
*
0.
15
44
**
*
0.
15
62
**
*
0.
16
25
**
*
0.
15
86
**
*
0.
16
5*
**
0.
17
07
*
**
(0
.0
63
9)
(0
.0
26
3)
(0
.0
16
2)
(0
.0
14
5)
(0
.0
12
4)
(0
.0
11
8)
(0
.0
12
6)
(0
.0
14
7)
(0
.0
14
6)
(0
.0
1
5
9)
S
A
V
E
0
.0
74
1*
*
0.
03
09
0.
06
37
**
*
0.
07
03
**
*
0.
08
15
**
*
0.
08
33
**
*
0.
09
39
**
*
0.
09
14
**
*
0.
09
5*
**
0
.0
95
8
**
*
(0
.0
30
9)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
10
3)
(0
.0
10
8)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
09
5)
(0
.0
10
8)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
09
1
)
E
X
R
E
G
IM
E
0.
12
02
*
-0
.2
93
3*
**
-0
.1
13
9*
**
-0
.0
13
7
0.
01
73
0.
02
37
**
0.
03
64
**
*
0.
03
94
**
*
0.
02
46
*
0
.0
39
7*
*
(0
.0
67
5)
(0
.0
66
2)
(0
.0
42
4)
(0
.0
16
6)
(0
.0
13
8)
(0
.0
09
4)
(0
.0
13
3)
(0
.0
14
7)
(0
.0
13
7)
(0
.0
1
7
2)
T
im
e
D
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2/
M
ea
n
A
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
R
at
e
0.
41
66
0.
31
9
0.
31
0
0.
30
4
0.
29
7
0.
30
1
0.
37
0
0.
30
1
0.
31
0
0.
29
9
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
5
6
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
9
89
0.
5
0.
55
0.
6
0.
65
0.
7
0.
75
0.
8
0.
85
0.
9
L
O
U
T
F
L
O
W
0.
27
88
**
*
0.
29
73
**
*
0.
31
91
**
*
0.
30
51
**
*
0.
33
9*
**
0.
34
17
**
*
0.
35
77
**
*
0.
38
22
**
0.
41
31
**
*
(0
.0
20
9)
(0
.0
26
6)
(0
.0
30
1)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
27
9)
(0
.0
30
3)
(0
.0
29
1)
(0
.0
42
4)
IN
F
L
O
W
0
.1
69
8*
**
0.
18
23
**
*
0.
15
53
**
*
0.
16
18
**
*
0.
14
77
**
*
0.
16
14
**
*
0.
18
95
**
*
0.
19
8*
**
0.
19
32
**
*
(0
.0
13
7)
(0
.0
20
6)
(0
.0
19
1)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
11
9)
(0
.0
16
7)
(0
.0
24
5)
(0
.0
32
)
S
A
V
E
0.
08
87
**
*
0.
08
49
**
*
0.
05
42
**
*
0.
04
79
**
*
0.
04
47
**
*
0.
05
47
**
*
0.
06
42
**
*
0.
06
18
**
*
0.
05
2*
**
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
16
3)
(0
.0
12
1)
(0
.0
06
7)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
9)
(0
.0
05
4)
(0
.0
07
1)
E
X
R
E
G
IM
E
0.
04
63
**
*
0.
07
21
**
*
0.
11
28
**
*
0.
13
34
**
*
0.
11
92
**
*
0.
16
87
**
*
0.
23
92
**
*
0.
33
97
**
*
0.
35
84
**
*
(0
.0
14
4)
(0
.0
26
3)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
18
8)
(0
.0
17
9)
(0
.0
27
4)
(0
.0
30
5)
(0
.0
40
2)
(0
.0
46
3)
T
im
e
D
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
M
ea
n
A
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
R
at
e
0.
29
3
0.
31
9
0.
32
7
0.
32
9
0.
27
3
0.
26
4
0.
26
6
0.
26
5
0.
27
3
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
56
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
98
9
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
is
g
ro
ss
ca
p
it
a
l
o
u
tfl
ow
s.
T
h
e
fi
rs
t
co
lu
m
n
is
fr
o
m
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
re
g
re
ss
io
n
a
n
d
ro
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
th
e
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
Q
u
a
n
ti
le
re
g
re
ss
io
n
is
fr
o
m
P
ow
el
l
(2
0
1
5
),
w
h
ic
h
u
se
s
a
d
a
p
ti
v
e
M
a
rk
ov
C
h
a
in
M
o
n
te
C
a
rl
o
sa
m
p
li
n
g
a
lg
o
ri
th
m
a
n
d
p
o
in
t
es
ti
m
a
te
s
th
a
t
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
to
m
ea
n
o
f
d
ra
w
s
a
n
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
th
e
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
a
re
d
er
iv
ed
fr
o
m
va
ri
a
n
ce
o
f
d
ra
w
s
(t
o
ta
l
8
,0
0
0
d
ra
w
s
a
ft
er
b
u
rn
in
g
th
e
fi
rs
t
2
,0
0
0
d
ra
w
s)
.
R
2
fo
r
th
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
m
o
d
el
a
n
d
m
ea
n
a
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
ra
te
fo
r
q
u
a
n
ti
le
re
g
re
ss
io
n
.
*
,
*
*
,
*
*
*
fo
r
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
50
Figure 2.2: The association between gross capital outflows and selected variables: fixed
effect regression and quantile regression
2.5.1.2 Equity outflows and debt outflows
This section disaggregates gross capital outflows into gross equity outflows
(FDIs + portfolio equities) and gross debt outflows (portfolio debts + other invest-
ments). Although they are usually aggregated for gross capital outflows, the character-
istics of two forms of capital are quite different because debt flows are larger and more
volatile than equity flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012a).
The results for equity flows are reported in Table 2.5 and summarized in Figure
51
2.3. Note that six countries14 are excluded because of small observations. The most
outstanding explanatory variable is the lagged dependent variable. The coefficient is
only 0.191 at 0.05th quantile but consistently increases and becomes 0.5765 at 0.9th
quantile. The result from FEOLS also designates its persistent nature (0.481). The
intuition suggests private sectors purchase equities in the long run aspects and, therefore,
the best predictor for current equity asset purchases is equity asset purchases in the past.
On the other hand, the association between equity outflows and saving or borrowing is
weak. As a result, the permanent change of capital outflows by current capital inflows or
saving is small although the influence of past equity purchases is strong.15 It might be
the evidence that private sectors do not purchase equities with sudden and unexpected
increase in external loans or saving. However, they keep purchasing the securities once
they decide to do so. The results, therefore, support three hypotheses but they are in
favor of permanent effects rather than temporary effects.
The result (Table 2.6 and Figure 2.4) for debt outflows is quite different from
that for equity outflows and is similar to the one for gross capital outflows; the QTEs
of past asset purchases and gross capital inflows are larger in the upper quantiles but
the latter are still smaller than the mean effect from FEOLS. The QTEs of private
saving are also larger when gross capital outflows are less than the median. The overall
conclusion is similar to the one in Section 2.5.1.1. It might indicate, therefore, the main
14Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Maldives, Mongolia, and Syria
15As robust checks, I ran several different OLS regression for equity flows: 1) including the twice-lagged
dependent variable as an explanatory variable, 2) excluding the lagged dependent variable (Achen, 2000),
and 3) excluding a lagged dependent variable and including lagged explanatory variables. However, none
of them provided a significantly different result, so I do not report them. They are available upon the
request.
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Figure 2.3: The association between gross equity outflows and selected variables: fixed
effect regression and quantile regression
result in Section 2.5.1.1 is mainly driven by debt outflows rather than equity outflows
and it is consistent with Forbes and Warnock (2012b).
2.5.2 Two-stage least squares and IV quantile regression model
2.5.2.1 Gross capital outflows
This section estimates the causal effects of explanatory variables by focusing
on two-stage least squares and IV quantile regression. The result with gross capital
outflows is reported in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.5. Although the result from 2SLS is not
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Figure 2.4: The association between gross debt outflows and selected variables: fixed
effect regression and quantile regression
significantly different from that from FEOLS, there are significant changes in the QTEs.
The impact of previous capital outflows is stronger during capital flight and it is similar
to the result from QR. On the contrary, the impact of capital inflows are much larger
compared to the result from QR and they are larger than the mean effect from FE2SLS
in the upper quantiles. As a result, a 1% increase in capital inflows at 90th quantile
increases about 0.75% in capital outflows and it is much larger than that from QR,
which was only 0.33%. However, when foreign asset purchases are less than the median,
the permanent effect is still small (e.g., 0.13% increase in capital outflows permanently
56
at 0.2th quantile).
The QTEs of saving from IVQR are also different from them from QR. In
contrast to the QTEs from QR that were larger than the mean effect in the lower
quantiles, the QTEs from IVQR keeps decreasing until 0.65th quantile so that they
exhibit a U-shaped curve over quantiles. As a result, although the impact of current
private saving is the largest at 0.05th quantile, because of the small QTE of the lagged
dependent variable at the same quantile, the long-run impact of it is not large (0.22%).
It is similar to the long-run impact at 0.9th quantile where the capital outflows are
the most persistent (0.15%). The conclusion from Section 2.5.1.1 is still valid: 1) the
causal impact of capital inflows is larger during capital flight, 2) it is larger than that
of private saving across quantiles, and 3) the causal impact of private saving is similar
to the mean effect (except at 0.05th and 0.1th quantiles). It means private sectors use
some saving when they purchase a small amount of foreign assets but during capital
flight, they increase borrowing rather than saving to increase foreign asset purchases.
The QTEs of exchange rate regime from IVQR is not significantly different from those
from QR except they are larger in the upper quantiles with IVQR.
2.5.2.2 Equity outflows and debt outflows
Equity outflows become even more persistent with IVQR as the QTEs are
larger than 0.8 after the median (Table 2.8 and Figure 2.6). On the contrary, the roles
of capital inflows and saving are still limited. None of them is larger than the estimates
from 2SLS, which again indicates temporary increase in capital inflows and saving rarely
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Figure 2.5: The impacts of selected variables on gross capital outflows: two-stage least
squares and IV quantile regression
affect equity outflows. It confirms again that individuals purchase equities in the long-
run aspects. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that because of the strong influence of
the lagged equity outflows, the permanent effect of capital inflows is also strong for
equity outflows, although temporary effects are still small in all quantiles. For example,
permanent increase in capital outflows by a 1% increase in capital inflows is only 0.027%
at 0.05th quantile while it becomes 1.76% at 0.85th quantile (0.21% for private saving).
Therefore, the influence of capital inflows is still large for equity outflows unlike private
saving.
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Figure 2.6: The impacts of selected variables on gross equity outflows: two-stage least
squares and IV quantile regression
The QTEs of the lagged dependent variable on gross debt outflows are larger
than the mean effect after 0.4th quantile and they are the largest at 0.75th and 0.85th
quantiles (Table 2.9 and Figure 2.7). Therefore, although it is less than equity outflows,
debt outflows are also persistent in the upper quantiles and they make the permanent
effects of capital inflows large, too. Meanwhile, the QTE of capital inflows increases in
the upper quantiles and it is the largest at 0.85th quantile. As a result, a 1% increase in
capital inflows increases only about 0.14% of capital outflows at 0.05th quantile but it
increases about 1.32% at 0.85 quantile. On the contrary, the influence of private saving is
61
still small in all quantiles. For example, a 1% increase in private saving increases capital
outflows by 0.13% permanently at both the 0.05th and 0.9th quantiles. Moreover, at
0.75th quantile where capital outflows are the most persistent, the increase in capital
outflows by private saving is the largest but increases only about 0.19%.
Section 2.5 can be summarized as follows. People are more dependent on
external loans than their saving when they purchase foreign assets and this tendency is
especially strong during capital flight. On the other hand, the impact of private saving
is relatively small regardless of the amount of assets purchased. This conclusion holds
for both gross equity outflows and gross debt outflows in the big picture.
2.6 Conclusions
The essay has estimated the quantile treatment effects of private saving and
gross capital inflows on gross capital outflows using Powell’s (2015) quantile regression
methodology. The main purpose was to see the impacts of two financial resources
on foreign asset purchases according to the conditional distribution of the outcome
variable. I especially focused on capital flight because it might designate the exodus of
domestic capital, and thus necessitates proper policy responses to prevent it. The result
justifies the quantile regression approach by confirming there are heterogeneous effects
of explanatory variables according to the conditional distribution of capital outflows. In
particular, during capital flight, the impact of gross capital inflows increases and it is
larger than the mean effect estimated by 2SLS. On the other hand, the impact of private
62
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Figure 2.7: The impacts of selected variables on gross debt outflows: two-stage least
squares and IV quantile regression
saving actually decreases as individuals increase foreign asset purchases. It implies
people use external loans rather than their incomes if there is any reason to increase
foreign investments substantially. Moreover, the result shows foreign investments are
more persistent in the upper quantiles and, because of this persistence, not only the
temporary effects but also the permanent effects of explanatory variables have increased
in the upper quantiles. Finally, it suggests people prefer a flexible exchange rate regime
during capital flight.
Dividing gross capital outflows into gross equity outflows and gross debt out-
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flows provides further information. Unlike gross debt outflows, which followed the char-
acteristics of gross capital outflows, the best predictor for equity outflows is the past
of them. Meanwhile, the QTEs of two financial resources is small and is smaller than
the mean effect. As a result, although the temporary effect of capital inflows is small,
it eventually becomes large in the long run because of the persistence of equity out-
flows. On the contrary, the long-run effect of private saving for equity outflows is still
small even after considering the persistent nature of gross equity outflows. Thus, the
conclusion is that for both equities and debts, the impact of external saving on foreign
investment is larger than that of domestic saving especially during capital flight. It is
consistent with existing literature.
The result suggests capital flight is not a market-exiting behavior by domestic
agents because they use borrowings rather than their saving to increase foreign asset
holdings. Therefore, it is unlikely that capital flight significantly decreases domestic
agents’ domestic asset holdings and it is consistent with the result in the first chapter of
my dissertation. For the same reason the result shows capital flight is associated with
capital inflow surges. Existing literature also supports debts-fueled capital outflows be-
cause they point out global factors representing external booms are the most important
factors causing capital flight. For instance, the global interest rate is usually low during
the boom and, as a result, it is easier for domestic firms to increase leverage. In this
case, the probability of domestic crises increases (e.g., see Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008)
and, therefore, the government has to implement policies such as capital controls to
prevent the economy from facing credit booms.
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Chapter 3
Are extreme capital outflow movements
indicators of financial crises?
3.1 Introduction
As capital outflows by domestic agents in emerging market economies have
been increasing significantly in recent years, a new literature is focusing on its impacts
on these economies. This essay investigates the association between extreme gross
capital outflow movements (capital flight and retrenchment) and diverse financial crises
in emerging markets, including banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises. Specifically,
we examine whether extreme gross capital outflow movements are leading or lagging
indicators (signal or symptom) of financial crises. Here, capital flight means a large
amount of foreign asset purchases by domestic agents, while retrenchment designates
a sharp drop in foreign asset purchases by these agents.1 Three strands of literature
1See Section 3.3.2 for the formal definitions.
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motivate the study.
First, domestic agents have better access to their local markets and therefore
have more information than foreigners. For example, Bae et al. (2008), Malloy (2005),
and Orpurt (2004) argue that local investors’ information advantage due to their prox-
imity to the market explains their superior performance at predicting earnings. Their
results suggest that local investors will prefer to invest in foreign markets with less risk
if they expect the domestic economy to face a financial crisis. Capital flight could then
occur as a result.
Second, recent research (e.g., Forbes and Warnock, 2012a, b and Caldero´n and
Kubota, 2013) has investigated the determinants of extreme capital outflow movements,
arguing that global factors, especially global risk aversion, are the main determinants
driving them. Similarly, Fratzscher (2012) and Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) have
studied the main drivers of capital outflows during the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009. However, few of them directly address the association between extreme capital
outflow movements and financial crises, the main purpose of this essay.2 We therefore
aim to shed new light on the link between the two.
Third, although there are few empirical studies of this association, some work
using DSGE models describes how productivity shocks affect optimal portfolio alloca-
tions between two countries. Regarding a financial crisis as a kind of negative produc-
2Some papers have, of course, studied the association between capital outflows and financial crises
(e.g., Dermirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998 and Mishikin, 1999). However, they differ from this essay
in two ways; first, they focus on general outflows rather than extreme movements, and second, they
study net rather than gross outflows and so do not discriminate between decisions made by domestic
investors and foreign investors.
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tivity shock, its impact on capital outflows can be explained theoretically. However,
some of the results are contradictory. For example, Tille and van Wincoop (2010) argue
that negative productivity shocks decrease the price of domestic equity and expected
excess returns on it. As a result, people reduce domestic asset purchases and gross cap-
ital outflows become counter-cyclical. To the contrary, Hnatkovska (2010) argues that
gross capital outflows are pro-cyclical. By her account, negative productivity shocks
in the nontradable sector raise the relative riskiness of domestic tradable equity while
increasing its relative risk premium. As a result, domestic agents are motivated by the
prospect of higher returns to purchase domestic rather than foreign equity. These con-
tradictory theoretical explanations of gross capital outflows emphasize the importance
of empirical evidence on the question.
Broner et al. (2013) is one of the few empirical studies investigating cyclical
behaviors of gross capital outflows during crises. Although they focus on general capital
outflows rather than extreme movements, their work is similar to this essay in the sense
that it explains the behaviors of capital outflows in middle income countries experienc-
ing diverse financial crises. Their results show that capital outflows are pro-cyclical and
therefore suggest that capital retrenchment, not flight, might be associated with domes-
tic turmoils. However, such cyclical behaviors do not address the association because
there might be some omitted variables affecting capital flows symmetrically during crisis
and non-crisis periods.3 In fact, our study shows that it is capital flight, not retrench-
3For example, governments might restrict capital outflows during a crisis to prevent sharp reductions
in domestic investment. In this case, capital market openness is an omitted variable affecting capital
outflows during crises.
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ment, that is positively associated with financial crises. This is one of our contributions
to the literature.
To briefly explain our results: first, banking, currency, and inflation crises are
positively associated with capital flight. Second, debt crises are also associated with
capital flight, although they are not robust to the specification of the regression. Third,
the results show that positive associations between capital flight and domestic crises
are mainly driven by banking flows rather than FDI and portfolio flows. FDI and
portfolio flows are actually negatively associated with financial crises. Finally, capital
retrenchment is not associated with most financial crises. Therefore, it necessitates
proper policy reactions to prepare for and respond to related financial crises when the
country is experiencing capital flight.
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationships between
capital outflows and financial crises, while Section 3 explains the data used for the study,
the formal definitions of flight and retrenchment, and the estimation strategy. Section
4 presents the main results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Linkages between capital outflows and financial crises
Capital outflows and financial crises could be related to each other in diverse
ways. On the one hand, financial crises might cause capital flight because people would
prefer to purchase less risky foreign assets if severe financial distress is present in the
domestic economy. Conversely, capital outflows may cause financial crises. For exam-
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ple, speculative attacks by domestic investors can cause currency crises and following
inflation crises in a country. Moreover, joint causality between two events is plausi-
ble. Specifically, investors’ expectations of future crises due to bad fundamentals may
encourage them to invest abroad, making their prediction of these crises self-fulfilling.
This section briefly discusses the relationships between capital outflows and financial
crises.
The relationship between capital outflows and banking crises is straightfor-
ward. According to our definition, a banking crisis generates significant signs of financial
distress in the country’s banking system and necessitates policy intervention. In this
case, domestic agents would withdraw their deposits from domestic banks and trans-
fer to foreign banks, consequently causing bankruptcies. More importantly, such bank
runs could be triggered by panic rather than agents’ rational expectations. Since the
seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), many papers have attempted to prove
panic-based contagion in banking crises, and experimental economics has made an es-
pecially notable contribution. For instance, Chakravarty et al. (2014) show that a run
on one bank triggers a run on other banks even though their liquidity and solvency are
unrelated. See Dufwenberg (2015) for a survey of the literature. According to them,
capital flight, rather than retrenchment, could be positively associated with banking
crises.
Given the tendency of large capital outflows to depreciate the domestic cur-
rency, the relationship between capital flight and currency crises is also clear. A flight
might indicate domestic agents’ speculative attacks on the domestic currency. For in-
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stance, if domestic investors have internal information that the government does not
have enough reserves to defend its peg regime, they will attempt to depreciate it.4
Moreover, if such depreciation is chronic, speculations could be prolonged, causing the
currency to collapse further. In the worst case, an inflation crisis may follow. It is note-
worthy that several developing countries tried to stabilize their currencies by managing
exchange rates. However, many of them failed and indeed only encouraged attacks.5
Such historical evidence suggests that currency and inflation crises are related to capital
flight.
After observing Latin American debt crises in the 1970s and 1980s and conse-
quent capital flight from the region, many researchers have attempted to explain why
private-sector investors fled domestic markets during a period of increasing probability
of a debt crisis. Dooley (1988) explains this phenomenon by the difference in domestic-
asset risk perceived by residents and nonresidents, respectively. That is, ex ante risk
perceived by residents is higher than that perceived by nonresidents due to factors such
as taxation on investment or inflation rate risk. As a result, the ex post risk premium un-
derestimates residents’ risk while overestimating that of nonresidents’, so simultaneous
debt inflows and private capital outflows occur. Similarly, Khan and Ul Haque (1985)
and Alesina and Tabellini (1989) argue that capital flight is due to expropriation risk
that residents tend to face when the government overaccumulates external debts. Ac-
cording to their analyses,, capital flight is a fleeing behavior intended to avoid domestic
uncertainty, and they build theoretical frameworks to explain why capital flight is as-
4See Obstfeld (1996), for example.
5See Dornbusch (1986).
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sociated with debt crises. Indeed, they show capital flight to be significantly associated
with debt crises even though one does not directly cause the other.
The discussion in this section thus provides the hypothesis of the essay: first,
capital flights rather than retrenchments are positively associated with financial crises.
Second, banking flows mainly drive this positive relationship between the two.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data
We use annual data for 60 emerging market economies from 1980 to 2009.6
Gross capital outflows, the key variable for defining capital flight, are net foreign asset
purchases (gross foreign asset purchases net of sales) by domestic agents that include
(1) FDI, (2) portfolio investment (equities and debts), and (3) other investment (e.g.,
trade credits, loans, and deposits).
For the independent variable, the model uses four different kinds of crises,
which are the main interests of this essay; banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises.
Each is an indicator variable which is 1 if a country is experiencing the corresponding
crisis in a given year and 0 otherwise. Banking and currency crisis data are from Laeven
and Valencia (2012). According to them, a country experiences a systemic banking crisis
if there are 1) significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (e.g., significant
bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations) and 2) significant
6See Table 3.1 for the list of countries.
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banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking
system. A currency crisis is defined as a nominal depreciation of the currency vis-a`-
vis the U.S. dollar of at least 30 percent and also at a rate of depreciation at least 10
percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation in the previous year. Debt crisis
is defined as per Broner et al. (2013), originally from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) but
supplemented by Standard and Poor’s data; a country has a debt crisis in a given year if
it downgrades to default levels for sovereign local-currency debt (a domestic debt crisis)
or for sovereign foreign-currency debt or the sovereign foreign-currency bank loans (an
external debt crisis). The indicator variable for an inflation crisis is 1 if the inflation
rate in a country is over 40%. Additionally, I define ‘financial crisis’ using an indicator
variable that is 1 if a country has experienced any of these four types of crises in a given
year. Note that I only consider the initial year of each crisis since the end of the crisis is
ambiguous in several cases. Moreover, it is hard to regard capital flights in the middle
of long-lasting crises as a response to them (or vice versa).
For control variables that are expected to reduce omitted-variable bias in
the estimator, I added the global real interest rate (GLOBRATE) and global real
GDP growth (GLOBGDP) as global common factors and capital market openness
(KAOPEN), domestic real GDP growth (ZGDP), and exchange rate regime (EXREGIME)
as domestic specific factors. Global real interest rate and global real GDP growth rate
are the averages of the G7 countries’7 real interest rates and real GDP growth, while
capital market openness is from Chinn and Ito (2006) which designates more opened
7U.S., U.K., Canada, Italy, France, Germany, and Japan
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economy with higher values. Finally, the exchange rate regime variable is a fine clas-
sification ranging from 1 to 16, with a larger index indicating a more flexible regime.8
Most of these variables are identified significant determinants of capital flight in other
research (e.g., Forbes and Warnock, 2012a and Caldero´n and Kubota, 2013). See Table
3.2 for a summary of these definitions and sources.
3.3.2 Definition of capital flight and retrenchment
Capital flight indicates large-scale purchasing of foreign assets by domestic
agents. That is,
• Flight: 
1 if KOjt ∈ {top 30% of (KOjs)Ts=1} ∩ {top 30% of (KOjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
where KO is gross capital outflows.
Additionally, to study the detailed relationships between capital flight and
crises, I use different definitions for flight episodes. First, top 30 percent may be generous
to indicate a large purchasing of capital assets in a country. For this reason, I define
“severe flight” as follows:
• Severe Flight:
1 if KOjt ∈ {top 20% of (KOjs)Ts=1} ∩ {top 20% of (KOjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
8Source: Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017)
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By definition, severe flight is a subset of flight.
Second, gross capital outflows consist of three different kinds of investments
(FDI, portfolio investments, and other investments). Foreign direct investments and
portfolio investments are associated with direct and indirect controls on enterprise and,
therefore, are usually stable and persistent.9 On the other hand, other investments,
comprising short-term debts such as bank loans, are more volatile and more easily
reversed. For this reason, other-investment flight might be more relevant to crises than
FDI and portfolio flights. To test this hypothesis, I define following the three kinds of
capital flight using different investments:
• FDI Flight:
1 if FDIjt ∈ {top 30% of (FDIjs)Ts=1} ∩ {top 30% of (FDIjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
• PI Flight: 
1 if PIjt ∈ {top 30% of (PIjs)Ts=1} ∩ {top 30% of (PIjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
• OI Flight: 
1 if OIjt ∈ {top 30% of (OIjs)Ts=1} ∩ {top 30% of (OIjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
where PI and OI are portfolio investments and other investments, respectively. These
three forms of flight are not necessarily subsets of ‘flight’, and there is nonzero overlap
9According to IMF BOP6 manual, FDI is associated with more than 10% of the voting power in the
enterprise and portfolio investment is associated with less than 10% of it.
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among them.
Likewise, I define capital retrenchments symmetrically. Retrenchment desig-
nates a large decrease in foreign asset purchases and is defined as follows:
• Retrenchment:
1 if KOjt ∈ {bottom 30% of (KOjs)Ts=1} ∩ {bottom 30% of (KOjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
• Severe Retrenchment:
1 if KOjt ∈ {bottom 20% of (KOjs)Ts=1} ∩ {bottom 20% of (KOjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
• FDI Retrenchment:
1 if FDIjt ∈ {bottom 30% of (FDIjs)Ts=1} ∩ {bottom 30% of (FDIjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
• PI Retrenchment:
1 if PIjt ∈ {bottom 30% of (PIjs)Ts=1} ∩ {bottom 30% of (PIjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
• OI Retrenchment:
1 if OIjt ∈ {bottom 30% of (OIjs)Ts=1} ∩ {bottom 30% of (OIjs)N,Tj=1,s=1}
0 otherwise
Table 3.3 and 3.4 summarize investments during flight (retrenchment) and
non-flight (non-retrenchment) periods. Note that the mean difference is very large and
statistically significant at less than the 1% level. Indeed, each episode is defined only if
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investments significantly change. Tables 3.5 through 8 show the frequency of each crisis
accompanying flight or retrenchment. For example, among a total of 68 banking crises,
19% at year t-1 were accompanied by capital flights at year t and 54% of them in year
t-1, t, or t+1 were accompanied by flights at year t. They suggest retrenchments are
more closely related to crises since cumulative frequency is higher for them.
3.3.3 Estimation strategy
Flights and retrenchments are abnormal phenomena in the sense that it takes
only about 19% of total observations. Since these dependent variables are skewed,
normal or logistic distributions, which are symmetric, might not be appropriate to model
their distributions. I use the complementary log-log (clog) model for such asymmetric
distributions. According to clog model, probability p(= Pr(y = 1|X)) is
F (X ′β) = 1− exp{−exp(X ′β)}
and marginal effect of jth variable, (∂p/∂xj), is
exp(−exp(X ′β))exp(X ′β)βj .
The dependent variable is the indicator variable designating capital flight or retrench-
ment and X ′tβ is
β0 + β1Crisist−1 + β2Crisist + β3Crisist+1 + β4GLOBRATEt
+ β5GLOBGDPt + β6KAOPENt + β7ZGDPt + β8EXREGIMEt
where ‘Crisis’ is the indicator variable for one of five crisis types; banking, currency,
debt, inflation, or financial crises. Crisist−1 and Crisist+1 are included to consider the
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possibility that domestic agents may purchase foreign assets the year before or after
a crisis. If the independent variable is significantly associated with capital flight or
retrenchment, it will contribute to increasing the likelihood of extreme capital outflow
movements.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Capital flight and retrenchment and financial crises
Table 3.9 and 3.10 show the estimation results.
First, domestic agents have purchased a large amount of foreign assets one
year before and after banking crises. Flights one year after the crisis are not surprising
because domestic agents will invest in safer foreign banks when systematic financial
distress is experienced in the domestic economy. Flights occurring one year before the
crisis may designate self-fulfilling prophecies of banking crises. For example, if domes-
tic agents expect a banking crisis in the near future they will withdraw their deposits
from domestic banks beforehand and save in foreign bank accounts. As a result, default
risk increases and banks may fail to pay their liabilities. This suggests that capital
flights might indicate bank runs and explains why they correlate with increased prob-
ability of banking crises in domestic economies. Therefore, when flights are observed,
policymakers may have to intervene to prevent domestic banks from defaulting.
Second, currency crises at year t are significantly associated with flights. This
suggests that a capital flight could be a speculative attack to take advantage of sustained
78
depreciation in emerging market economies. If so, the domestic government has to
implement sound policies against flight to prevent it triggering currency depreciation.
The interesting point is that capital inflows usually surge during flight periods.10 This
might indicate that domestic investors have access to internal information that foreign
investors do not, which they use to depreciate their currency successfully.
Third, debt crises and flights are not significantly associated. This result stands
against Latin America’s experiences in the 1970s and 1980s with capital flights during
debt crises, and might indicate that a positive association between debt crises and flights
was a regional feature of Latin America in the past rather than a global phenomenon in
general. However, an alternative specification provides a different result, namely debt
crises are positively associated with flights (see Section 3.4.2). For this reason, this essay
does not conclude that debt crises and capital flights are not associated.
Fourth, inflation crises at year t are positively associated with flights. This is
not surprising considering the positive association between flights and currency crises.
Moreover, many emerging markets have dollarized their currencies after the value of
those currencies collapsed through hyperinflation.
Lastly, financial crises at years t-1 and t are positively associated with flights
at year t. On the one hand, this result shows that investors avoid domestic turmoil and
prefer to invest in safer foreign markets supporting the “flight-to-safety” hypothesis. On
the other hand, it implies flights cause financial crises by collapsing domestic currencies
and self-fulfilling people’s expectations of them.
10See Rey (2013). In my data, the mean of capital inflows during flight periods is 7.92 % of GDP
which is only 3.9% of GDP during no-flight periods. The mean difference is significant at the 1% level.
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To the contrary, capital retrenchment is not associated with any type of fi-
nancial crisis. The results therefore show that it is flight, not retrenchment, that is
significantly associated with financial crises. Put simply, domestic agents increase for-
eign asset purchases during financial crises.
Global real interest rate and growth are both important indicators for flights
and retrenchments. Investors increase foreign asset purchases in good times when the
global interest rate is low and growth is strong, which implies that investors consider
risks more than returns. However, domestic real GDP growth is associated neither
with flights nor with retrenchments, a result that does not change even if estimation
is done without crisis indicator variables. Capital market openness is associated with
both flights and retrenchments because more liberalized capital markets allow domestic
agents to increase their investment in foreign countries. The coefficient of exchange rate
regime is significant only for flights, showing that investors increase their investments
when exchange rates are more rigid so as to avoid exchange rate risk. In sum, this result
shows that both global common factors and domestic specific factors are important
indicators for estimating the likelihood of extreme capital outflow movements.
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
To verify these results, I perform several robustness checks. First, I use differ-
ent dependent variables, ‘severe flight’ and ‘severe retrenchment’, also defined in Section
3.3.2. Second, I exclude the years of the global financial crisis (2007-2009) on the basis
that these three years may have driven significant associations between capital flights
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and financial crises globally. Third, I include country-fixed effects to estimate the prob-
ability of episodes.11
The results are reported in Table 3.11 and 3.12 and are almost identical to
those in Section 3.4.1.12 Banking, currency, inflation, and financial crises are still signif-
icantly associated with capital flights, but are mostly not associated with retrenchments.
Moreover, debt crises are now significantly associated with flights if capital outflows are
within the top 20 percent (‘severe flights’). These findings are consistent with arguments
in the existing literature on the relationship between financial crises and capital outflows
and confirm that domestic investors prefer foreign assets during domestic turmoil.
3.4.3 FDI, portfolio investment, and other investment movements and
financial crises
Gross capital flows consist of three different kinds of capital flows; foreign di-
rect investments, portfolio investments, and other investments. Since the determinants
of each component are different,13 the relationship between financial crises and flights or
retrenchments of each type of flow might be also different. To investigate this hypoth-
esis, I define flight and retrenchment using three kinds of flows, considered separately.
In particular, I hypothesize that other investment flows mostly drive the positive asso-
ciation between capital flight and financial crises because this association mostly relates
to hot money.
11If we include country-fixed effects, the coefficients of them for countries that never experienced crises
are unidentifiable and, thus, they are dropped. Since these countries are important control groups, I
did not include fixed effects in the main estimation.
12I do not report the coefficients of control variables to save space. There is little change.
13See Forbes and Warnock, 2012b
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The results are reported in Table 3.13 and 3.14. Several interesting features
emerge. First, these results confirm the previous results about flights and retrenchments.
That is, in most cases it is flight rather than retrenchment that is associated with finan-
cial crises. Second, the results also confirm the hypothesis that other investments drive
positive association between flight and financial crises: to be specific, other-investment
flights are associated with all kinds of financial crises. Although FDI flight in year t is
positively associated with a banking crisis in year t+1, we see this is mainly attributable
to the global financial crisis (see Table 3.16). Third, PI retrenchment is the only re-
trenchment that is positively related to financial crises. It is positively associated with
currency crises at year t+1 and, considering that OI flight is associated with currency
crises at years t-1 and t, this suggests a dynamic of capital outflows: namely, investors
retrench their portfolio investments the year before a currency crisis and increase other
investments during the crisis. It is reasonable for investors to convert portfolio invest-
ments to other investments for currency attacks because the latter are more liquid than
the former. Therefore, governments need to monitor and manage other investments
such as bank loans and deposits carefully to prevent financial crises or to minimize the
damage induced by them.
3.5 Conclusions
This essay has shown that capital flight, especially OI flight, is positively as-
sociated with financial crises. The estimation results may be summarized as follows:
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• Banking crises and capital flights are positively associated. To be specific, capital
flight is a leading and lagging indicator of a banking crisis, suggesting that bank-
ing crises could be self-fulfilling prophesies brought about when domestic agents
believe domestic banks are likely to go bankrupt. Moreover, banking flows to
other countries will increase if severe financial distress is present in the domestic
economy.
• Currency crises and capital flights are positively associated. The empirical evi-
dence may imply that, in this case, flights of capital are speculative attacks by
domestic investors, which in many cases are successful.
• Debt crises and capital flights are positively associated only if outflows are ex-
traordinarily large. If domestic agents expect sovereign default, they may pur-
chase foreign rather than domestic assets for fear of expropriation risk. However,
further research is warranted since the result is not robust.
• Inflation crises and capital flights are positively associated. This is not surprising
considering the positive association between currency crises and flights and the fact
that many emerging market economies dollarized their currencies during inflation
crises.
Overall, capital flights are reliable indicators of financial crises. The results are
remarkable considering that only the initial years of crises were considered for the study,
while financial crises have been very persistent in developing countries. Governments
therefore need to pay attention to gross capital outflows to implement sound policies
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when investors are purchasing large amounts of foreign assets. Moreover, this essay
suggests banking flows are critical to monitor because they are most closely correlated
with crises. For example, tight banking outflow controls may prevent domestic agents
from converting their domestic deposits into foreign deposits and save domestic banks
from systemic bankruptcies. Capital outflows especially need to be managed when they
indicate currency attacks by domestic investors. Otherwise, a severe currency collapse
and subsequent inflation crisis are likely outcomes.
This essay has described general relationships between extreme capital outflow
movements and financial crises. Based on the empirical evidence presented here, an
interesting topic for future research would be to study detailed relationships (particularly
causality) between capital flights and each type of crisis, and the mechanisms behind
them.
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Table 3.1: The list of countries
Total: 60
Albania Angola Argentina
Armenia Azerbaijan, Rep. of Belarus
Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana
Brazil Bulgaria Chile
China, P.R.: Mainland Colombia Congo, Republic of
Costa Rica Croatia Dominican Republic
Ecuador Egypt El Salvador
Gabon Georgia Guatemala
Honduras India Indonesia
Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan
Latvia Libya Lithuania
Macedonia Malaysia Mauritius
Mexico Moldova Mongolia
Morocco Namibia Nicaragu
Pakistan Paraguay Peru
Philippines Poland Romania
Russian Federation South Africa Sri Lanka
Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Thailand
Tunisia Turkey Ukraine
Uruguay Venezuela, R.B. Vietnam
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Table 3.2: Data sources
Variable Definition Source
Gross capital outflows Net foreign-asset purchase by IMF BOPS
(% of GDP) domestic agents. Foreign assets
consist of foreign direct
investment, portfolio investment,
and other investment
Crisis Indicator variables that is
Banking Crisis 1 if there is 1) significant signs Laeven and Valencia
of financial distress and (2012)
2) significant banking policy
intervention in the banking
system.
Currency Crisis 1 if nominal depreciation of Laeven and Valencia
the currency vis-a`-vis the U.S. (2012)
dollar is at least 30 percent
and also at least 10 percentage
points higher than the rate of
depreciation in the year before.
Debt Crisis 1 if a country defaults Reinhart and Rogoff
by local-currency debts (2009) and Broner et
or by foreign-currency debts al. (2013)
Inflation Crisis 1 if inflation rate is larger than Author’s calculation
40%
Financial Crisis 1 if a country experiences Author’s calculation
any of banking, currency,
debt, and inflation crises.
Global real interest The average of G7 countries’ IMF IFS
rate (%) real interest rate
Global real GDP The average of G7 countries’ World Bank
real growth (%) GDP growth
Real GDP growth (%) IMF WEO
GDP (nominal and real) IMF WEO
Capital market The index ranged from 0 to 1. Chinn and Ito
openness 1 means the most liberalized (2006)
market.
Exchange rate regime The index ranged from 1 to 16. Ilzetzki, Reinhart
16 means the most flexible regime. and Rogoff (2016)
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Table 3.3: The summary of capital flows during flight and non-flight periods
Flight=1
Episode Outflows Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Capital Flight Gross 285 7.8456 5.2199 2.5659 41.548
Severe Capital Flight Gross 157 9.9521 5.6044 4.1297 41.548
FDI Flight FDI 176 1.5315 1.8799 0.3192 13.8796
PI Flight Portfolio 156 2.9891 3.4678 0.455 16.7802
OI Flight Others 268 6.2804 4.5202 2.1485 39.4907
Flight=0
Episode Outflows Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Capital Flight Gross 1,219 0.875 2.6105 -15.0481 13.5752
Severe Capital Flight Gross 1,347 1.2919 2.9629 -15.0481 18.2399
FDI Flight FDI 1,328 0.0842 0.3643 -2.9665 5.2214
PI Flight Portfolio 1,348 0.1198 0.9397 -4.8828 12.4681
OI Flight Others 1,236 0.4937 2.2313 -14.9735 9.9569
Notes: Mean difference for all investments between two periods is significant at less than the 1%
level.
Table 3.4: The summary of capital flows during retrenchment and non-retrenchment
periods
Retrenchment=1
Episode Outflows Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Capital Retrenchment Gross 307 -1.5993 2.392 -15.0481 0.1697
Severe Capital Gross 198 -2.188 2.6983 -15.0481 -0.0437
Retrenchment
FDI Retrenchment FDI 110 -0.3201 0.5112 -2.9665 -0.002
PI Retrenchment Portfolio 189 -0.4021 0.6805 -4.8828 -0.00002
OI Retrenchment Others 315 -1.7255 2.4245 -14.9735 0
Retrenchment=0
Episode Outflows Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Capital Retrenchment Gross 1,197 3.1693 4.0857 -5.3839 41.548
Severe Capital Gross 1306 2.8605 4.0538 -6.2403 41.548
Retrenchment
FDI Retrenchment FDI 1,394 0.2988 0.8692 -0.1687 12.8796
PI Retrenchment Portfolio 1,315 0.5352 1.7387 -0.563 16.7802
OI Retrenchment Others 1,189 2.3859 3.2983 -5.3839 39.4907
Notes: Mean difference for all investments between two periods is significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 3.5: The frequency of banking crises accompanying flight or retrenchment
Obs.=1,800
No. of Frequency Cumulative
Crises t-1 t t+1 Frequency
Flight 68 19% 13% 19% 54%
Retrenchment 68 16% 18% 16% 50%
Table 3.6: The frequency of currency crises accompanying flight or retrenchment
Obs.=1,800
No. of Frequency Cumulative
Crises t-1 t t+1 Frequency
Flight 81 15% 21% 14% 49%
Retrenchment 81 21% 22% 14% 57%
Table 3.7: The frequency of debt crises accompanying flight or retrenchment
Obs.=1,638
No. of Frequency Cumulative
Crises t-1 t t+1 Frequency
Flight 76 17% 12% 11% 38%
Retrenchment 76 17% 20% 17% 50%
Table 3.8: The frequency of inflation crises accompanying flight or retrenchment
Obs.=1,432
No. of Frequency Cumulative
Crises t-1 t t+1 Frequency
Flight 46 9% 17% 9% 35%
Retrenchment 46 22% 19% 22% 57%
No. of Crises: The number of initial years of crisis
Cumulative Frequency: Total flights in year t accompanied by crises
in year t-1, t, or t+1
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Table 3.9: The association between capital flight and crises
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisis
(t-1) 0.7071** 0.4641 0.3576 -0.5986 0.4012**
(0.2961) (0.3036) (0.3038) (0.72) (0.1962)
(t) 0.1607 1.1487*** 0.0985 1.1391** 0.4123**
(0.3599) (0.2685) (0.3452) (0.4644) (0.1992)
(t+1) 0.5775* 0.3967 -0.0342 -0.1745 0.2008
(0.3063) (0.3317) (0.3836) (0.6923) (0.2245)
GLOBRATE -0.4152*** -0.4146*** -0.422*** -0.3881*** -0.4171***
(0.0502) (0.0494) (0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0498)
GLOBGDP 0.197*** 0.1934*** 0.1865*** 0.2073*** 0.1947***
(0.0651) (0.0658) (0.0657) (0.069) (0.0649)
KAOPEN 0.0995** 0.1118** 0.1251*** 0.1229*** 0.1068**
(0.0446) (0.0451) (0.048) (0.0465) (0.0451)
ZGDP 1.36 2.1648 0.6773 0.5767 1.7957
(1.8304) (1.6874) (2.035) (1.9957) (1.7384)
EXREGIME -0.0378** -0.0509*** -0.0336* -0.0361* -0.0491***
(0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0175)
Constant 0.1004 0.1288 0.1631 0.0038 0.1237
(0.2606) (0.252) (0.2769) (0.2706) (0.2551)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 263 263 237 238 263
Notes: Dependent variable is capital flight that is defined in Section 3.2. Each column represents
banking, currency, debt, inflation, and financial crises for the variable ‘Crisis’, respectively.
‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a country experiences
any crisis. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.10: The association between capital retrenchment and crises
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisis
(t-1) -0.3201 -0.0522 -0.2781 0.3438 -0.2605
(0.3144) (0.2667) (0.3044) (0.3433) (0.1897)
(t) -0.3113 -0.0555 -0.1703 -0.0899 -0.2388
(0.3236) (0.2714) (0.3001) (0.4749) (0.1959)
(t+1) -0.1138 -0.3707 0.027 0.5358 -0.0286
(0.312) (0.3136) (0.2922) (0.3623) (0.1869)
GLOBRATE 0.0985* 0.0868* 0.101** 0.0922* 0.0924*
(0.049) (0.0491) (0.0511) (0.0505) (0.0492)
GLOBGDP -0.1112* -0.1052* -0.1365** -0.1388** -0.1104*
(0.0599) (0.06) (0.0628) (0.0629) (0.0601)
KAOPEN -0.0881* -0.0891* -0.0932* -0.0976* -0.0936*
(0.0487) (0.0489) (0.051) (0.0504) (0.0487)
ZGDP -1.362 -1.0853 -0.4325 -0.8895 -1.7087
(1.2189) (1.2114) (1.3629) (1.2913) (1.2597)
EXREGIME 0.0171 0.0197 0.0167 0.0205 0.0239
(0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.016)
Constant -1.7247*** -1.7647*** -1.7723*** -1.7444*** -1.7495***
(0.2988) (0.3014) (0.3167) (0.3133) (0.3005)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 285 285 262 267 285
Notes: Dependent variable is capital retrenchment that is defined in Section 3.2. Each col-
umn represents banking, currency, debt, inflation, and financial crises for the variable ‘Crisis’,
respectively. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a country
experiences any crisis. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.11: Robustness Check; Flight
Severe Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.4534 0.6367 0.9011** 0.1848 0.5622**
(0.4623) (0.4013) (0.3517) (0.7318) (0.2587)
Crisist 0.1754 1.202*** 0.6623* 1.1265* 0.5299**
(0.5083) (0.375) (0.3952) (0.6521) (0.2569)
Crisist+1 0.8124** 0.6312 -0.5518 0.6689 0.28
(0.3888) (0.4293) (0.7252) (0.7002) (0.3028)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 147 147 130 131 147
Excluding Global Financial Crisis
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.6933** 0.5267* 0.3259 -0.5536 0.4291**
(0.2968) (0.3036) (0.3204) (0.7211) (0.1998)
Crisist -0.2339 1.1517*** 0.0978 1.1865** 0.3826*
(0.4544) (0.2808) (0.3659) (0.4713) (0.2096)
Crisist+1 0.2166 0.4128 -0.1433 -0.142 0.0439
(0.3921) (0.3514) (0.421) (0.6922) (0.2496)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,243 1,243 1,143 1,128 1,243
No. of events 219 219 196 198 219
Including Country-fixed Effects
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.7434** 0.4249 0.482 -0.5168 0.5255**
(0.3032) (0.3232) (0.3262) (0.7265) (0.207)
Crisist 0.1451 1.0655*** 0.1353 1.162** 0.4578**
(0.3693) (0.2914) (0.3565) (0.5253) (0.2054)
Crisist+1 0.5896* 0.3996 -0.0597 -0.0332 0.291
(0.3265) (0.3486) (0.3999) (0.7441) (0.2331)
Country 55 55 51 54 55
Obs. 1,222 1,222 1,112 1,106 1,222
No. of events 263 263 235 238 263
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.12: Robustness Check; Retrenchment
Severe Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.1777 0.0949 -0.5724 0.6602* -0.2819
(0.373) (0.3122) (0.4256) (0.3825) (0.2372)
Crisist -0.0609 0.0124 0.11 -0.1752 -0.0423
(0.3618) (0.3249) (0.3284) (0.6067) (0.2297)
Crisist+1 0.1568 -0.3743 -0.1932 0.6142 -0.0486
(0.3473) (0.3939) (0.3883) (0.4296) (0.2306)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 189 189 172 176 189
Excluding Global Financial Crisis
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.2879 -0.0376 -0.2404 0.3393 -0.2403
(0.3138) (0.2663) (0.3039) (0.3423) (0.1898)
Crisist -0.2157 -0.022 -0.1103 -0.0837 -0.186
(0.3261) (0.274) (0.3019) (0.4734) (0.1981)
Crisist+1 -0.0288 -0.3413 0.0592 0.5441 0.0136
(0.3141) (0.3158) (0.2919) (0.3635) (0.1892)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,243 1,243 1,143 1,128 1,243
No. of events 261 261 239 243 261
Including Country-fixed Effects
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.327 -0.0251 -0.2905 0.4159 -0.2825
(0.3259) (0.2744) (0.3164) (0.3748) (0.1982)
Crisist -0.2545 -0.019 -0.1482 -0.0341 -0.2466
(0.3319) (0.2901) (0.3163) (0.5157) (0.2064)
Crisist+1 -0.0717 -0.3166 0.0853 0.6802* -0.0027
(0.3257) (0.3198) (0.3119) (0.3883) (0.1998)
Country 54 54 51 54 54
Obs. 1,246 1,246 1,151 1,163 1,246
No. of events 285 285 262 267 285
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.13: The association between FDI, portfolio, and other-investment flight and
crises
FDI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 Omitted -0.1644 -1.2371* Omitted -0.8584**
(0.4706) (0.7309) (0.4072)
Crisist 0.6093 -0.5579 -0.464 Omitted -0.1647
(0.3714) (0.5814) (0.5194) (0.3186)
Crisist+1 1.0568*** -0.0052 0.1229 Omitted 0.4463
(0.3327) (0.4687) (0.4649) (0.2817)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,297 1,356 1,250 1,168 1,356
No. of events 169 169 158 154 169
PI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.0227 0.3127 -0.044 Omitted 0.137
(0.5218) (0.4116) (0.4485) (0.3151)
Crisist -0.323 -0.8376 -0.9197 Omitted -0.5588
(0.6017) (0.7392) (0.7067) (0.4097)
Crisist+1 -1.3454 -1.5066 -1.4736 Omitted -1.3327**
(1.0034) (1.0083) (1.0031) (0.5999)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,168 1,356
No. of events 152 152 139 135 152
OI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.5645* 0.6309** 0.6287** 0.4527 0.4343**
(0.3042) (0.2938) (0.2925) (0.4568) (0.1943)
Crisist 0.1302 1.3497*** 0.1849 1.0344** 0.5301***
(0.3668) (0.2621) (0.3471) (0.4802) (0.1938)
Crisist+1 0.2917 0.3065 0.1399 -0.1881 0.0762
(0.3431) (0.3486) (3694) (0.7067) (0.2323)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 238 238 213 214 238
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant term.
‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a country expe-
riences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and the coefficient is
unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.14: The association between FDI, portfolio, and other-investment retrenchment
and crises
FDI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.0788 0.2841 -0.6156 0.2177 -0.359
(0.4554) (0.4253) (0.5945) (0.712) (0.3328)
Crisist -0.8389 0.4061 -0.0138 0.3257 -0.1541
(0.7124) (0.4054) (0.4604) (0.7111) (0.3149)
Crisist+1 -0.2223 -0.0584 -0.3419 Omitted -0.2244
(0.587) (0.5211) (0.5922) (0.3518)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,216 1,356
No. of events 101 101 83 90 101
PI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.3507 -0.1458 -0.0913 -1.0533 -0.265
(0.4543) (0.4309) (0.4004) (1.0008) (0.2724)
Crisist -0.1228 0.2864 -0.2514 -0.2132 -0.0656
(0.4026) (0.3643) (0.4243) (0.7515) (0.2617)
Crisist+1 -0.3495 0.7708** -0.2639 -0.8938 0.0556
(0.5072) (0.312) (0.4742) (1.0273) (0.2698)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 175 175 162 162 175
OI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.392 -0.0204 -0.5792* 0.4077 -0.345*
(0.33) (0.2691) (0.3463) (0.3571) (0.1987)
Crisist -0.4079 -0.0864 -0.0621 -0.0472 -0.2331
(0.3403) (0.2827) (0.295) (0.4813) (0.2021)
Crisist+1 0.0292 -0.4159 -0.2357 0.2094 -0.1409
(0.2985) (0.3246) (0.3294) (0.4203) (0.1958)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 293 293 265 271 293
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and
the coefficient is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.15: Robustness Check (Flight); Severe Flight
FDI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 Omitted -0.6661 Omitted Omitted -1.6271**
(0.745) (0.7378)
Crisist 0.2735 -1.3903 -1.3459 Omitted -0.4009
(0.5277) (1.0063) (1.0132) (0.4577)
Crisist+1 1.0409** -1.1934 0.4531 Omitted 0.4842
(0.4451) (1.0001) (0.5354) (0.3823)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,297 1,356 1,185 1,168 1,356
No. of events 97 97 88 87 97
PI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.6843 0.3506 0.3799 Omitted 0.448
(0.5454) (0.5392) (0.5162) (0.3824)
Crisist -0.7905 -0.8504 -0.263 Omitted -0.5279
(1.0054) (1.016) (0.7172) (0.5208)
Crisist+1 Omitted -0.882 Omitted Omitted -1.8486*
(1.0127) (1.0092)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,304 1,356 1,195 1,168 1,356
No. of events 89 89 81 81 89
OI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.7321* 0.7277* 1.0044*** -0.5777 0.519**
(0.4063) (0.3948) (0.348) (1.0121) (0.2615)
Crisist 0.3621 1.7253*** 0.7007* 1.0529 0.832***
(0.4708) (0.3123) (0.3925) (0.6444) (0.2355)
Crisist+1 0.5729 0.4466 -0.1547 0.5927 0.0918
(0.4285) (0.468) (0.596) (0.7151) (0.3149)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 131 131 115 114 131
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant term.
‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a country
experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and the coefficient
is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.16: Robustness Check (Flight); Excluding Global Financial Crisis
FDI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 Omitted 0.0591 -0.9095 Omitted -0.6201
(0.4733) (0.7334) (0.4155)
Crisist 0.3718 -0.7541 -0.1082 Omitted -0.1912
(0.474) (0.7052) (0.5196) (0.3708)
Crisist+1 0.7017 0.0201 0.3284 Omitted 0.4084
(0.4358) (0.5212) (0.4717) (0.324)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,184 1,243 1,143 1,057 1,243
No. of events 117 117 108 102 117
PI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.0318 0.3595 0.0224 Omitted 0.1723
(0.5211) (0.4109) (0.4512) (0.3201)
Crisist -0.1334 -0.7619 -0.827 Omitted -0.3966
(0.5999) (0.7457) (0.7071) (0.4204)
Crisist+1 Omitted -1.4075 -1.3925 Omitted -1.6334**
(1.0095) (1.0027) (0.7278)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,195 1,243 1,143 1,059 1,243
No. of events 131 131 120 114 131
OI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.5221* 0.6255** 0.534* 0.4357 0.4**
(0.3024) (0.2942) (0.3087) (0.4617) (0.1985)
Crisist -0.1146 1.2523*** 0.0959 0.9586** 0.4769**
(0.4201) (0.2708) (0.3708) (0.4837) (0.2023)
Crisist+1 -0.0234 0.2446 -0.0104 -0.2194 -0.0904
(0.4203) (0.3697) (0.4001) (0.7029) (0.2525)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,243 1,243 1,143 1,128 1,243
No. of events 206 206 182 186 206
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and
the coefficient is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.17: Robustness Check (Flight); Including Country-fixed Effects
FDI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 Omitted -0.0565 -1.2514 Omitted -0.8336**
(0.4527) (0.7659) (0.402)
Crisist 0.5091 -0.4234 -0.3379 Omitted -0.146
(0.4213) (0.5581) (0.5634) (0.3276)
Crisist+1 1.019*** 0.021 0.1636 Omitted 0.4976*
(0.3513) (0.5005) (0.5119) (0.3015)
Country 42 42 41 41 42
Obs. 899 846 891 817 946
No. of events 169 169 156 154 169
PI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.0201 0.438 0.2799 Omitted 0.2368
(0.5054) (0.4019) (0.4489) (0.3084)
Crisist -0.6063 -0.6417 -0.8077 Omitted -0.5539
((0.6293) (0.7354) (0.7529) (0.4135)
Crisist+1 -1.7219* -1.6465 -1.5245 Omitted -1.518**
(1.0154) (1.0305) (0.9635) (0.5986)
Country 43 43 41 42 43
Obs. 1,007 1,007 936 847 1,007
No. of events 152 152 138 135 152
OI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.5337* 0.5987* 0.6777** 0.4015 0.5076**
(0.3122) (0.3145) (0.34) (0.4824) (0.2121)
Crisist 0.0923 1.2443*** 0.2483 0.8015 0.5673***
(0.378) (0.2832) (0.3568) (0.5345) (0.1998)
Crisist+1 0.2718 0.3042 0.1467 -0.2206 0.1539
(0.3669) (0.3623) (0.3932) (0.7492) (0.2399)
Country 55 55 51 53 55
Obs. 1,216 1,216 1,106 1,091 1,216
No. of events 238 238 211 214 238
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a country
experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and the coefficient
is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.18: Robustness Check (Flight); Excluding Intersection
FDI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 Omitted -1.3888 Omitted Omitted -2.4511**
(1.0168) (1.0263)
Crisist 0.6901 -1.4722 -0.2278 Omitted -0.0776
(0.4495) (0.9827) (0.5819) (0.3962)
Crisist+1 0.7155 0.1749 0.0583 Omitted 0.357
(0.4768) (0.5218) (0.6176) (0.3548)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,297 1,356 1,185 1,168 1,356
No. of events 84 84 78 80 84
PI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.0997 -0.022 0.0787 Omitted -0.0184
(0.7436) (0.625) (0.58) (0.4461)
Crisist -0.0636 -0.9946 Omitted Omitted -0.8026
(0.7404) (1.0569) (0.6333)
Crisist+1 Omitted -1.0086 Omitted Omitted -1.8867*
(1.0171) (1.0133)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,304 1,356 1,136 1,168 1,356
No. of events 74 74 63 66 74
OI Flight
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.4741 0.6071* 0.6163* 0.6589 0.3996*
(0.3303) (0.3276) (0.333) (0.4674) (0.2147)
Crisist -0.2354 1.3565*** 0.1557 1.1886** 0.5227**
(0.4649) (0.2786) (0.4024) (0.489) (0.2145)
Crisist+1 -0.1682 0.3877 0.233 -0.0317 0.0127
(0.4578) (0.3731) (0.3963) (0.7211) (0.2581)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 163 163 142 146 163
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and
the coefficient is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.19: Robustness Check (Retrenchment); Severe Retrenchment
FDI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.267 0.2972 -0.5008 -0.3109 -0.4427
(0.4623) (0.4614) (0.6114) (1.0042) (0.3727)
Crisist -1.3484 0.3958 -0.1005 0.4637 -0.0818
(0.9942) (0.4426) (0.5146) (0.7098) (0.3361)
Crisist+1 0.0295 0.1841 -0.2178 Omitted 0.0042
(0.5879) (0.5231) (0.6003) (0.3578)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,216 1,356
No. of events 83 83 71 74 83
PI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.4237 -0.4304 -0.3186 Omitted -0.6408*
(0.5083) (0.522) (0.4656) (0.3374)
Crisist -0.1417 0.2378 -0.5446 -0.8972 -0.0323
(0.4302) (0.3916) (0.5208) (1.0511) (0.2857)
Crisist+1 -0.0879 0.5049 -1.1099 Omitted -0.2444
(0.5076) (0.3737) (0.7052) (0.3272)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,189 1,356
No. of events 149 149 138 138 149
OI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.3226 -0.0718 -0.5582 0.571 -0.4464*
(0.3985) (0.3442) (0.4245) (0.4108) (0.2616)
Crisist -0.5746 -0.151 -0.4215 -0.5758 -0.5244**
(0.4453) (0.345) (0.3996) (0.722) (0.2658)
Crisist+1 -0.1089 -0.1584 -0.7826 0.1939 -0.3216
(0.3935) (0.3631) (0.5038) (0.5096) (0.2603)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 190 190 171 177 190
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and
the coefficient is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.20: Robustness Check (Retrenchment); Excluding Global Financial Crisis
FDI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.0336 0.2444 -0.6348 0.2175 -0.4033
(0.456) (0.4283) (0.5969) (0.7131) (0.3351)
Crisist -0.7217 0.4265 -0.03 0.32 -0.1124
(0.7144) (0.4092) (0.4614) (0.7133) (0.3198)
Crisist+1 -0.1507 -0.0104 -0.3697 Omitted -0.205
(0.5894) (0.5254) (0.594) (0.3574)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,243 1,243 1,143 1,107 1,243
No. of events 97 97 80 86 97
PI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.3526 -0.138 -0.0351 -1.0242 -0.2232
(0.454) (0.4322) (0.4062) (1) (0.2755)
Crisist -0.3618 0.1808 -0.3746 -0.201 -0.1964
(0.5031) (0.3854) (0.4637) (0.7554) (0.2862)
Crisist+1 -0.2143 0.7304** -0.2202 -0.8704 0.0888
(0.5096) (0.3303) (0.4801) (1.0302) (0.2825)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,243 1,243 1,143 1,128 1,243
No. of events 144 144 133 132 144
OI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.3582 0.0014 -0.5301 0.4037 -0.3213
(0.3294) (0.269) (0.3456) (0.356) (0.1993)
Crisist -0.2648 -0.0363 0.0134 -0.0377 -0.156
(0.3413) (0.2859) (0.2981) (0.4795) (0.2054)
Crisist+1 0.1359 -0.369 -0.2003 0.2208 -0.0888
(0.3008) (0.3269) (0.3291) (0.4204) (0.1984)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,243 1,243 1,143 1,128 1,243
No. of events 262 262 236 240 262
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and
the coefficient is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.21: Robustness Check (Retrenchment); Including Country-fixed Effects
FDI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 0.3101 0.4167 -0.6739 0.9404 -0.1617
(0.4749) (0.4317) (0.5774) (0.7799) (0.344)
Crisist -1.1357* 0.2397 -0.0723 1.7717*** -0.2227
(0.6746) (0.4532) (0.4614) (0.6714) (0.3616)
Crisist+1 -0.4308 -0.1191 -0.4045 Omitted -0.1629
(0.6493) (0.5486) (0.6477) (0.3873)
Country 33 33 30 33 33
Obs. 739 739 656 654 739
No. of events 101 101 83 90 101
PI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.3751 -0.2411 -0.2234 -1.1385 -0.3864
(0.4549) (0.4711) (0.4054) (0.9806) (0.2918)
Crisist -0.1159 0.1769 -0.3866 -0.2155 -0.175
(0.4126) (0.3891) (0.456) (0.8113) (0.2879)
Crisist+1 -0.3714 0.6701** -0.3688 -0.8456 -0.0512
(0.5323) (0.3295) (0.5226) (1.0907) (0.2858)
Country 53 53 51 52 53
Obs. 1,205 1,205 1,137 1,125 1,205
No. of events 175 175 161 162 175
OI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.4542 -0.0406 -0.6224* 0.3789 -0.3933*
(3401) (0.279) (0.3622) (0.3918) (0.2082)
Crisist -0.4306 -0.1096 -0.0575 -0.1389 -0.2718
(0.3509) (0.3039) (0.3249) (0.5224) (0.218)
Crisist+1 -0.0143 -0.4031 -0.1526 0.1858 -0.1483
(0.3149) (0.3314) (0.347) (0.4524) (0.2062)
Country 59 59 55 58 59
Obs. 1,343 1,343 1,233 1,222 1,343
No. of events 293 293 265 271 293
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and
the coefficient is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.22: Robustness Check (Retrenchment); Excluding Intersection
FDI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.0703 -0.131 Omitted Omitted -0.737
(0.5949) (0.584) (0.4653)
Crisist -0.4054 0.0679 0.1459 -0.1411 -0.0819
(0.7107) (0.5405) (0.5284) (1.0074) (0.3721)
Crisist+1 -0.2448 -0.4618 0.0409 Omitted -0.0951
(0.7097) (0.7142) (0.6) (0.3962)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,185 1,189 1,356
No. of events 65 65 56 58 65
PI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.3807 0.2304 0.0328 Omitted -0.1521
(0.5875) (0.4668) (0.4822) (0.323)
Crisist 0.183 0.4831 0.0639 0.3639 0.26
(0.4574) (0.4601) (0.4623) (0.7743) (0.3026)
Crisist+1 -0.6449 0.8343** -0.3742 -0.3358 0.0278
(0.7155) (0.3878) (0.6154) (1.0257) (0.3425)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,209 1,356
No. of events 113 113 110 104 113
OI Retrenchment
Banking Currency Debt Inflation Financial
Crisist−1 -0.3603 0.0689 -0.7536* 0.3273 -0.2709
(0.3648) (0.2869) (0.4158) (0.4056) (0.2158)
Crisist -0.2553 -0.0706 0.044 -0.0094 -0.0759
(0.3622) (0.3143) (0.3219) (0.5349) (0.2181)
Crisist+1 0.0721 -0.9451** -0.2328 0.4747 -0.1968
(0.3275) (0.4583) (0.3628) (0.4208) (0.2222)
Country 60 60 60 60 60
Obs. 1,356 1,356 1,250 1,237 1,356
No. of events 227 227 208 211 227
Notes: Control variables are global real GDP growth, global real interest rate, capital
market openness, domestic real GDP growth, exchange rate regime, and a constant
term. ‘Financial crisis’ is an indicator variable that takes on a value of unity if a
country experiences any crisis. ‘Omitted’ means there is no sample to estimate, and
the coefficient is unidentifiable. Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis and *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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A.1 The list of countries
Country Year Country Year
Angola 1990 Lesotho 1990
Armenia 1995 Lithiania 1995
Belarus 1997 Malaysia 1990-2009
Belize 1990 Maldives 1990
Bolivia 1990 Mexico 1990
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 Moldova 1995
Botswana 1990 Mongolia 1990
Brazil 1990 Morocco 1990
Bulgaria 1990 Namibia 1990
Chile 1990 Nigeria 1990
Colombia 1990 Pakistan 1990
The Rep. of the Congo 1990-2007 Paraguay 1990
Costa Rica 1990 Peru 1990
Cote d’Ivore 1990-2013 Philippines 1990
Dominica 1990-2013 Poland 1990
Dominican Republic 1990 Romania 1990
Egypt 1990 Russia 1995
El Salvador 1990 Saint Lucia 1990-2013
Georgia 1997 Seychelles 1990
Grenada 1990-2013 South Africa 1990
Guatemala 1990 Sri Lanka 1990
Honduras 1990 Syria 1990-2010
India 1990 Thailand 1990
Indonesia 1990 Tunisia 1990
Jamaica 1990 Turkey 1990
Jordan 1990 Ukraine 1995
Kazakhstan 1994 Uruguay 1990
Latvia 1995 Venezuela 1990-2013
Notes: Total 56 countries. Year indicates available gross capital outflow data
in each country. It covers until 2014, unless specified.
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A.2 Data sources
Variable Definition Source
Gross capital inflows Net domestic-asset purchase IMF BOPS
(% of GDP) by foreign agents. Domestic assets
consist of foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, and other
investment
Gross capital outflows Net foreign-asset purchase
(% of GDP) by domestic agents. Foreign assets
consist of foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, and other
investments
GDP (nominal and real) IMF WEO
Real GDP growth (%)
Total investment Gross capital formation
(% of GDP)
Capital market openness The index ranged from 0 to 1. Chinn and Ito
1 means the most liberalized market (2006)
Exchange rate regime The index ranged from 1 to 16. Ilzetzki et al.
16 means the most flexible regime (2016)
Private saving Gross national saving - Gross Alfaro et al.
public saving (2014)
Gross national saving=
(Gross national disposable income)
-(Consumption expenditure)
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A.3 Generalized Method of Moments estimator
Appendix A.3 briefly introduces three kinds of two-step GMM estimators (dif-
ference GMM, system GMM, and orthogonal deviation GMM) that were used in this
essay.1 Appendix A.3.1 explains how two-step GMM estimators become feasible and effi-
cient and Appendix A.3.2 describes three GMM estimators: difference GMM (DGMM),
system GMM (SGMM), and orthogonal deviation GMM (OGMM). Appendix A.3.3
discusses the tests to prove their validity.
A.3.1 Two-step GMM: efficiency and feasibility
We begin with following simple model:
y = X
′
β + u (A.1)
where y is the column vector for a dependent variable, X is the matrix for k independent
variables ((x1, x2, ..., xk)
′
), and β is the column vector for coefficients. The primary
purpose of IV regression is to find instruments matrix, Z, that satisfies
E[Zû] = 0 (A.2)
where û=y−X ′ β̂=(û1, û2, ..., ûN )′ and Z is the matrix for j instruments, ((z1, z2, ..., zj)′)
for j ≥ k. Each IV regression has their own strategy but the GMM estimator uses
positive-semidefinit matrix, A, to measure the magnitude of it, which is (1/N)û
′
ZAZ
′
û.
1Appendix A.3 is the summary of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell
and Bond (1998), and Roodman (2009a). See their papers for detailed descriptions of GMM estimators.
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The first order condition of it is
1
N
û
′
ZAZ
′
X = 0 (A.3)
Accordingly,
1
N
û
′
ZAZ
′
X = 0
⇒(y −Xβ̂)′ZAZ ′X = y′ZAZ ′X − β̂′X ′ZAZ ′X = 0
⇒X ′ZAZ ′Xβ̂ = X ′ZAZ ′y (A = A′)
⇒β̂ = (X ′ZAZ ′X)−1X ′ZAZ ′y
β̂, here, is a GMM estimate.
Feasibility and efficiency depend on weighting matrix A. If the estimator is
unbiased, β̂ does not change regardless of A but the magnitude of each moment is largely
affected by it even if each moment condition is satisfied. The magnitude especially can
be inflated by the variance of each instrument if some instruments have high variance and
they will prevent β̂ being efficient. To suppress such high variance of each instrument,
the GMM estimator uses the inverse of variance matrix of moments as a weighting
matrix (var(Zû)−1). As a result, we can get an efficient GMM estimate such as
β̂ = (X
′
Z[var(Zû)]−1Z
′
X)−1X
′
Z[var(Zû)]−1Z
′
y (A.4)
= (X
′
Z[Z
′
E(û
′
û|Z)Z]−1Z ′X)−1X ′Z[Z ′E(û′ û|Z)Z]−1Z ′y
Although it is an efficient estimate, we still don’t know if it is feasible, yet.
Defining H = E(û
′
û|Z), a remaining issue is that we need to estimate E(û′ û|Z) before
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estimating β̂. It necessitates reasonable and minimal assumptions on û. The most
reasonable and safest assumption would be that it is homoscedasticity. Under this
i.i.d. assumption, E(û
′
û|Z) = ME(u′u|Z)M ′ = σ2MIM ′ = σ2MM ′, where M is the
matrix to transform u according to the estimator and I is an identity matrix. The
One-step GMM estimator, therefore, uses it as a weighting matrix. To be specific,
β̂1step = (X
′
Z[Z
′
HZ]−1Z ′X)−1X ′Z[Z ′HZ]−1Z ′y where
HDGMM =

2 −1 0 . . .
−1 2 −1 . . .
0 −1 2 . . .
0 0 −1 . . .
...
...
...
. . .

, HSGMM = HOGMM = I
2 (A.5)
Of course, this one-step estimator is not robust to heteroscedastistic error terms. To
estimate β̂, which is robust to them, we estimate H by running the regression with
β̂1step. Therefore,
β̂2step = (X
′
Z[Z
′
Ĥ1stepZ]
−1Z
′
X)−1X
′
Z[Z
′
Ĥ1stepZ]
−1Z
′
y (A.6)
and it is flexible to heteroscedastistic errors. This essay uses this two-step GMM esti-
mator. A weakness of the two-step GMM estimator is that it underestimates standard
errors. To fix this problem, I follow Windmeijer’s (2005) correcting algorithm.
2Roodman (2009a) suggests slightly different HSGMM considering the transformation of equations
and this essay follows his suggestion. See (26) in his paper.
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A.3.2 Difference, system, and orthognal deviation GMM estimators
We now begin with the following panel data model in which i is for individuals
and t is for time with traditional assumptions.
yit = X
′
itβ + uit (A.7)
uit = ηi + it
E(ηi) = E(it) = E(ηiit) = 0
We first take difference of it to get rid of fixed effects, which generates:
∆yit = ∆X
′
itβ + ∆it (A.8)
where ∆yit = yit− yit−1, for example. At this stage, ∆X ′itβ and ∆it are still correlated
with each other under the assumption that Xit and it are correlated with each other.
In difference GMM estimator, we construct the instrument set, Z, which contains twice
and further lagged Xs (adding the first lag if X is predetermined) to satisfy the moment
conditions, E(|z) = 0. The lags are suitable instruments for original variables as they
are strongly correlated with the latter and, therefore, satisfy the exclusion restriction
condition. However, two additional conditions should be satisfied for the validity of the
instruments. First, they have to be orthogonal to error terms. Second, differenced error
terms should not be serially correlated. Specifically, they are
E[(Xit−s∗it)] = 0 for t ≥ 3 and s ≥ 2 (A.9)
where ∗it is the transformed error term and
E[(it − it−1)(it−2 − it−3)] = 0 for t ≥ 3 (A.10)
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When these conditions are satisfied, lagged variables become appropriate instruments.
On the contrary, Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that the first-differenced
GMM estimator can work as a weak instrument if original variables are highly persistent,
as lagged levels will be weakly correlated with subsequent first differences. If so, it causes
large finite-sample biases and it motivated them to extend the system by adding level
equations. Accordingly, β̂ is estimated by the following equation∆yit
yit
 =
∆Xit
Xit

′
β̂ +
∆uit
uit
 (A.11)
and ∆Xit−1 is used as the instruments for level equations.3
With (A.9) and (A.10), an additional condition is required for ∆Xit−1 to be
valid instruments. Since fixed effects are still left in level equations, differenced lags
themselves need to be orthogonal to fixed effects, which means
E[∆Xit−1(ηi)] = 0 (A.12)
This indicates samples are not too far from steady states throughout the sampled pe-
riod and, therefore, the deviations are not systematically correlated with fixed effects.
Assuming Xit = γXit−1 + (δηi + υit), Blundell and Bond (1998) show the following
condition should be satisfied for (C.12) with the first observation, xi1:
E
[(
xil − δηi
1− γ
)
δηi
]
= 0 (A.13)
The sufficient condition (but not necessary) for (A.13) is that xit and yit both have
stationary processes (|γ| < 1).
3First differences can be replaced with orthogonal deviations, which are described below.
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Difference GMM also might not work well with unbalanced panel data be-
cause if some observations are missing, available equations may significantly decrease.
For example, if yit−1 is not observed, not only the equation for yit−1 but also the one
for yit is not available. This might cause small sample bias and make GMM inefficient.
Furthermore, Bun and Windmeijer (2010) argue the system GMM estimator for the
dynamic panel data models might have a similar weak instrument problem as the differ-
ence GMM estimator does. Under this circumstance, the system GMM estimator is not
a consistent estimator anymore. In this case, orthogonal deviation GMM (Arellano and
Bover (1995)) could be a solution. Orthogonal deviation GMM requires each equation
to be subtracted from the average of future available samples. That is,
∆∗xit = cit(xit − 1
Tit
∑
s>t
xis) (A.14)
where cit =
√
Tit/(Tit + 1) and Tit is the number of observations from time t for individ-
ual i. Multiplying cit allows HOGMM to be an identity matrix under i.i.d. assumption
and we can see only one equation is unavailable for missing xit with unbalanced panel
data. Hayakawa (2009) shows that the orthogonal deviation GMM estimator has smaller
finite sample biases than the difference GMM estimator under the dynamic panel data
model using Monte Carlo simulations.
A.3.3 Tests for validity
As stated above, (A.9) and (A.10) have to be satisfied for GMM estimators to
be valid. First, the Sargan or Hansen test can be performed to test (A.9). The Sargan
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test and Hansen test have their own pros and cons. For instance, if error terms are
heteroscedastic, the result from the Sargan test is not robust, unlike the Hansen test. On
the other hand, the Hansen test is vulnerable to too many instruments, unlike the Sargan
test. Considering homoscedasticity is hardly satisfied, this essay has performed Hansen
tests and reported them in the results.4 Additionally, when we estimate system GMM
estimator, we need to check whether newly added instruments (differenced lags) are also
orthogonal to error terms without the original instrument set because the Hansen test
only reports the statistic with the whole instrument set. We can verify this condition
by performing a difference-in-Hansen test that performs the test only with newly added
instruments. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test (and difference-in-Hansen test) is
that (additional) instruments are orthogonal to error terms.
Second, to prove (A.10), we test whether differenced error terms are second-
order serially correlated. It is called an Arellano-Bond test, as they first suggested it.
The null hypothesis is that differenced error terms are not serially correlated of order 2.
GMM requires time span, T, to be short because of possible problems that
might be caused by too many instruments.5 First, too many instruments can overfit
instrumented variables. In extreme cases, instruments might perfectly predict instru-
mented variables and, as a result, the GMM estimator simply becomes an OLS estima-
tor.6 In this case, GMM fails to expunge endogenous components in estimates. Second,
because of too many moments to estimate, GMM might estimate a weighting matrix
4The methods to reduce the number of instruments are discussed below.
5See Roodman (2009b).
6Imagine a 2SLS estimator with R2 = 1 in the first stage.
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imprecisely. Third, the Hansen test (difference-in-Hansen test) becomes favorable to
instruments by reporting a p-value that is almost 1.000. As a result, the Hansen test
and GMM estimates lose credibility.
As a result of these problems, any researcher who uses GMM estimators needs
to control the number of instruments. Roodman (2009b) suggests two ways of reducing
the number. First, we can use only certain lags rather than all lags and, second, we can
collapse the instrument matrix. It is also possible to use both methods together. For
instance, if we collapse the original instrument set and use only three lags, it becomes
as follows:

xi1 0 0 0 0 0 . . .
0 xi2 xi1 0 0 0 . . .
0 0 0 xi3 xi2 xi1 . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .

⇒

xit−4 0 0
xit−3 xit−4 0
xit−2 xit−3 xit−4

We can see that the number of instruments are significantly reduced from T(T-1)/2 to
3 for one variable.
How many instruments are appropriate? Unfortunately, there is no clear an-
swer for this because a small number of instruments also hurts the efficiency of the
estimator. As a rule of thumb, Roodman (2009b) suggests the number of instruments
to be smaller than the number of individuals in the data. This essay follows his sugges-
tion and the number of instruments are reported in the result to prove it.
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B.1 Adaptive Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling algo-
rithm
Appendix B.1 briefly describes the AMCMC sampling algorithm that is used
in this essay.1 As the name “Monte Carlo” implies, AMCMC estimates parameters by
calculating the mean of a number of sample parameters from quasi-posterior distribu-
tion. The algorithm begins with an arbitrary initial parameter X0, µ0, an arbitrary
initial covariance matrix Σ0 for a proposal distribution, an initial value of a scaling
parameter λ0, a targeted acceptance rate α
∗, a dampening parameter δ, and draws T.
We set t=0 and repeat steps 1-8 while t ≤ T (Baker, 2014):
1. Draw a candidate Yt ∼MVN(Xt, λtΣt).
1See Andrieu and Thoms (2008) and Baker(2014) for a detailed description of AMCMC and Cher-
nozhukov and Hong (2003) for the application of it.
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2. Compute α(Yt, Xt) = min
[
pi(Yt)
pi(Xt)
, 1
]
3. Set Xt+1 = Yt with probability α(Yt, Xt) and Xt+1 = Xt with probability 1 −
α(Yt, Xt).
4. Compute weighting parameter γt =
1
(1+t)δ
.
5. Update λt+1 = exp[γt(α(Yt, Xt)− α∗)]λt.
6. Update µt+1 = µt + γt(Xt+1 − µt).
7. Update Σt+1 = Σt + γt[(Xt+1 − µt)(Xt+1 − µt)′ − Σt]
8. Increment t.
The result is the sequence {Xt}Tt=1 and the estimate is the mean of them. The per-
formance of MCMC depends on the proposal distribution. If it fails to propose proper
candidates, the mean of the sequence will not converge to the target parameter.
AMCMC uses symmetric distribution as a proposal distribution and, in many
cases, (multivariate) normal distribution is used. This essay uses multivariate normal
distribution with the mean Xt and the variance-covariance matrix λtΣt (See, e.g., An-
drieu and Thoms, 2008). We can see that the proposal distribution adapts to the new
information that is embodied in the mean and covariance matrix. Next, we need to de-
cide whether to accept a new candidate. The probability to accept a candidate is pi(Yt)pi(Xt)
in which pi(Xt) is the target distribution of Xt. To understand the target distribution,
recall our objective function, f(b):
f(b) = −N
2
gˆ(b)
′
Aˆgˆ(b) (B.1)
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and this objective function can be transformed into a quasi-posterior distribution,
p(b|X) = ef(b)· p(b)/ ∫B ef(b)db (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003) and via Bayes’ rule, we
can see that the posterior distribution is proportional to ef(b) : p(b|X) ∝ ef(b).2 There-
fore, the acceptance rate, min
[
pi(Yt)
pi(Xt)
, 1
]
, implies we accept Yt in 100% if it increases the
value of the target distribution. The acceptance rate provides the information to judge
whether AMCMC works properly because too many or too few acceptance of new draws
disrupts its convergence. Rosenthal (2011) shows the optimal acceptance rate is 0.234
but argues the algorithm’s efficiency remains high in [0.1, 0.6]. The target acceptance
rate, α∗, assists the actual acceptance rate α(Yt, Xt) to be in this range.
Dampening parameter δ controls how quickly the impact of the “tuning” pa-
rameters decays through the parameter γt. For large values of δ, γt =
1
(1+t)δ
approaches
zero quickly as t grows and, as a result, λt+1 = λt, µt+1, Σt+1 = Σt and the proposal
distribution stops adaptation and becomes stable. µt is a sort of pseudo-mean in the
sense that it is only used to update covariance matrix, Σt. Note that the mean of the
proposal distribution is Xt. Lastly, the values of parameters used for the estimation are
as follows:
• Draws: 10,000
• Burns: 2,000
• µ0 = X0
• α∗ = 0.3-0.6
2The prior distribution of the parameter is assumed to be uniform so that it is constant over the
support of the parameter.
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• δ = 0.234 (Powell, 2015)
• λ = 2.382/29 (Andrieu and Thoms, 2008)
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B.2 Data sources
Variable Definition Source
Gross capital outflows Net foreign-asset purchase by IMF BOPS
(% of GDP) domestic agents. Foreign assets
consist of foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, and other investment
Gross capital inflows Net domestic-asset purchase by IMF BOPS
(% of GDP) foreign agents. Domestic assets
consist of foreign direct investment,
portfolio investment, and other investment
GDP (nominal and real) IMF WEO
Private saving Gross national saving - Gross Alfaro et al. (2014)
public saving
Gross national saving =
(Gross national disposable income)
-(Consumption expenditure)
Exchange rate regime The index ranged from 1 to 16. Ilzetzki, Reignhart
16 means the most flexible regime and Rogoff (2016)
Real GDP growth (%) IMF WEO
Capital market openness The index ranged from 0 to 1. Chinn and Ito
1 means the most liberalized market (2006)
Public saving (Government revenue) - (Government Alfaro et al. (2014)
expenditure) + (Grants and other revenue)
+ (Accumulation of reserves) - (Capital
transfer payments abroad)
Domestic credit Financial resources provided to the private WDI
sector by financial corporations
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